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28 April 1980

## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PLO MEN INTERVIEWED ON ISRAELI ASSASSINATION PLOT

DW101158 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 7 Apr 80 pp 123-132 DW

[Interview with 'Abdallah al-Franji, PLO representative in Bonn, and (Sulayman Salamah) by Paul Lersch and Adel Selias in the Berlin SPIEGEL office; undated]

[Text] (Salamah) (presented al-Franji a bouquet of flowers): These flowers are for 'Abdallah al-Franji who is fighting for his cause as an honorable and upright revolutionary. These roses instead of the bullet I was supposed to put in his head today.

SPIEGEL: Mr al-Franji, plans to assassinate you were made. How did you learn about it?

Al-Franji: On 23 January (Salamah) saw me in my office for the first time in Bonn's Kaiserstrasse. He told me that he was born in Beersheba, the place where my family comes from. Now he was in need, he said, he needed money and could I help him.

(Salamah): 'Abdallah was surprised that the first thing I asked him for was money, but he emptied his pockets and put on the table what he had--about 80 marks.

SPIEGEL: But you did not go to al-Franji on your own initiative.

(Salamah): I went to him by order of the Israelis. I was to contact him and win his confidence. I also told 'Abdallah about a common friend, Kamil al-Sharif, who is a minister in the Jordanian cabinet now, and so I quickly won his confidence.

SPIEGEL: So you work for the Israeli Intelligence Service. When did you start?

(Salamah): I started as early as in 1970, but it was only last year that I was sent to Germany.

SPIEGEL: Mr al-Franji, did you not become suspicious when (Salamah) turned up in your office?

Al-Franji: At first I did not. Then after a short while he came again, wanted us to supply him a passport, telephoned frequently and then gradually I got a strange feeling, because he did not answer some questions really correctly. He pronounced my name, stressing it on the wrong syllable, like a Lebanese would. I questioned him with growing distrust, until I simply asked him: Who sent you?

SPIEGEL: And did he tell you the truth?

Al-Franji: No, he was excited, he didn't want to talk in the office, because he was probably afraid of bugs. We got into my car and drove around. Finally I had a very long talk with him in the building of the Arab League. That was early in March. It was only after I had persistently asked him questions that he told me a few things: the Israelis had told him to try and work in our office. They also asked him whether he could leave a suitcase there with explosives.

SPIEGEL: Was that a clear instruction?

Al-Franji: Probably not yet, and they did not insist when (Salamah) refused to do so. It was only later on, on Friday, 2 weeks ago, when it became more concrete.

(Salamah): I was asked to come to the Israeli Embassy at 2200. There Jacques, whom I had met with often earlier, asked me whether I was ready to make an attempt on al-Franji's life. I was supposed to shoot him in front of the building on Kaiserstrasse.

SPIEGEL: What was the plan?

(Salamah): Jacques told me I should make an appointment with al-Franji on Tuesday, 25 March, in the evening at about 2000. Either I should meet him at his office and ask him to drive me to the station afterwards or we could meet at the Hotel Bristol where I had met him earlier. In either case I was to shoot him on the way to his car which he always parks under Reuter bridge.

SPIEGEL: But did you have a weapon?

(Salamah): The details were to be discussed on that Tuesday when I was asked to come again by 1000. They were to give me a gun at that time.

Al-Franji: As early as Friday evening following this talk he phoned me. We agreed to meet immediately, not in Bonn but in the Cologne Central Railroad Station, platform 4. We then went to Gelsenkirchen by car where he has his apartment. He told me about the plan.

SPIEGEL: Did you know that (Salamah) was in the embassy on that evening?

Al-Franji: Ever since he told me about his work for the Israelis I always knew exactly when he met them. In the beginning we were suspicious and had him observed, we saw him actually going into the embassy in Bad Godesberg.

SPIEGEL: Why did you not see to it immediately after he had told you the truth that he leave the country?

Al-Franji: We contemplated it. But at first we wanted to see why the Israelis had recruited him. It was only when the plan became clearer that we agreed that he should not turn up at the appointed time on Tuesday at 1000.

SPIEGEL: Why did you not go ahead until quite concrete evidence was available, the handing over of the gun, for instance?

Al-Franji: That was too dangerous. We might not have been able to keep the thing under control. (Salamah) was also afraid that the Israelis might find out that he had divulged everything.

SPIEGEL: Mr (Salamah), how were you supposed to get away safely following this adventurous plan?

(Salamah): The Israelis told me that I didn't have to worry; there is a car not very far away which will pick you up immediately. You will get a passport and will be taken to Israel. You can have an important position there in the occupied territories. You will be well rewarded. But I was really afraid the Israelis might eliminate me afterwards as an accessory.

SPIEGEL: Mr Al-Franji, why should the Israelis plan such risky actions in the Federal Republic.

Al-Franji: The risk was not that large, on the contrary. If the plan had been a success, people would have said: the Palestinians are killing each other again. It was like that in other cases, in Paris, Rome, Copenhagen. I am a proponent of the moderate line. People would say the radicals had lashed out, and that would have fitted into the Israelis' plan. The Federal Republic would have been turned into a battlefield, the good German relations with 'Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Organization would have been affected.

SPIEGEL: How come the Israelis wanted to use (Salamah) of all persons?

Al-Franji: After all, he had worked for them for many years, and there was probably some reason why they sent him to Germany. Moreover, they have also set somebody else on my tracks. But I cannot say anything about that so as not to endanger him and his family.

SPIEGEL: How did the Israeli Intelligence Service hire you, Mr (Salamah)?

(Salamah): In the Six-day War in 1967 I fought for the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), and I was imprisoned in Jordan in 1968 because of illegal possession of arms. I met a man there whose name is (Asaad Hilmi Bitar). After being released we met again, and he asked me for an automatic weapon. I got him a Kalashnikov. He shot a man by the name of (Mustafa el-Dash) with it in broad daylight in an Amman cafe. After that he went underground; he fled from Damascus to Ankara where he met an Israeli agent named David....

SPIEGEL: ...Who turned (Bitar) around....

(Salamah): At any rate this David questioned him about his acquaintances and friends and sent him to Amman where he was supposed to establish contacts with us. (Bitar) told me that I should go with him to the American Embassy in Ankara where I could meet a man of the American intelligence service.

In Ankara (Bitar) said frankly for the first time that in fact the Israeli Embassy was involved. I met David there who asked me whether I wanted to cooperate. He gave me an Israeli passport, paid all my hotel expenses at Ataturk Square and the costs of my stay. I also received an El-Al ticket for a flight to Tel Aviv. I was told that I would be picked up at the airport. That was in 1970.

SPIEGEL: How could you as a Palestinian Liberation fighter work for the Israelis?

(Salamah): This was an adventure for me. Moreover, I wanted to see my homeland of Palestine again. In this way I could legally return to my homeland.

SPIEGEL: What did the Israelis expect from you?

(Salamah): I got a beautiful apartment right in the center of Tel Aviv. Intelligence people came regularly, always asking me about one issue: What I knew about the resistance movement. I had many friends, relatives and acquaintances in the resistance movement. I knew about groups working in the occupied areas. I reported on them.

SPIEGEL: For money?

(Salamah): They were not stingy. They gave me 6,000 for my first mission. I was supposed to find out about offices and bases of Palestinians in Amman, and I was also supposed to report on their activities in the occupied zones. For that purpose I received a Rome-Beirut-Amman ticket and a passport with a fake German visa. So it looked as if I had come from Germany.

SPIEGEL: How did you deliver your reports?



(Salamah): They taught me first of all how to write secret letters. I was supposed to write normally with ink and between the lines I was to put in the information with secret ink. All letters were supposed to be sent to Vienna; I received a mailbox number for that purpose.

SPIEGEL: What other missions did you have?

(Salamah): The Israelis were also interested in Egypt. I was primarily supposed to collect information on the positions of missiles which were stationed east of Cairo. From Cairo I gave my information to a Palestinian who was also an Israeli agent and who gave my letter directly to David in Ankara. The same agent also brought back money for me, \$6,000. I had run out of money because I had stayed longer in Egypt than planned.

SPIEGEL: Since then you have worked continuously for the Israelis?

(Salamah): Yes. In various cities in the Middle East, most of all, however in Jordan, always with new false passports. I was given so many names that I almost don't know the right one any more. I maintained constant contact with David; I met him frequently in Ankara, but also in Rome. Once I was caught by the Iraqis. They tortured me with electrical methods, but they never found out that I was an Israeli agent.

SPIEGEL: How were you ordered to go to Germany?

(Salamah): In Amman in February 1979 I received a postcard from Ankara. This postcard had been prepared with a microfilm containing orders and instructions which one can read with the help of a gadget. It said: You must go to the Federal Republic of Germany and ask for political asylum as a Palestinian. I did not know why I received that mission. But that was what it said. First I was supposed to fly to East Berlin and from there I should go to West Berlin. I made the application in the office for foreigners, the social office gave me a room in home number 77. But the following seemed strange to me: I was in the home for hardly 1 month when permission to re-settle to West Germany came. Asylum was granted soon thereafter.

SPIEGEL: What is so strange about that?

(Salamah): Everything went so fast. Other Palestinians often have to wait for many months or even years. In my case everything went smoothly. A woman in the social office helped me, I presume that she worked together with the Israelis.

SPIEGEL: When did the intelligence service establish contact with you again?

(Salamah): Once, it was in May of last year, a man talked to me in Arabic on the street in Gelsenkirchen where I lived; it was (Abu Saki). He told me I should report to Bonn immediately by phone, Bonn 02221/8231, and ask for Jacques. I made the call and a voice said: Israeli Embassy, shalom.



But Jacques was in a conference. A gentleman came to the phone whose name was Didi. He said: "Cordially welcome, at last," and he gave me a date. I was supposed to meet him in the embassy. He said: There are many Palestinians who come to our embassy because of their personal papers. I went there and reported there under my cover name (Abu Jalil). An official searched me for arms. I was insulted about that, but he calmed me down by saying that even members of the embassy must be searched.

SPIEGEL: You received new instructions there?

(Salamah): Didi first questioned me on the treatment in Berlin and in Gelsenkirchen; however, he was excellently informed. The first meeting lasted for half an hour. He gave me DM1,000 and demanded that I maintain constant contact with him by telephone, once or twice every week. I did that. He announced in a conversation that an expert from my country would like to talk to me. When we met he said he had come from El-Beit. The intelligence service in Israel is called El-Beit, which means in German: the house. The expert reminded me that the former Israeli governor in my homeland had done good deeds for my family and for my tribe. Out of gratitude I should accept new missions and help Israel. El-Beit was said to have full confidence in me. My first mission was to collect all information in Gelsenkirchen and its surroundings on the many Arabs living there: where they come from, what their names are, what they were doing and to what Palestinian groups they belonged. I was supposed to immediately report everybody who cooperated at all with the PLO. Moreover, I was supposed to recruit others for intelligence work.

SPIEGEL: How were you supposed to act?

(Salamah): First of all I was supposed to talk to the people and find out what they thought of the policy of the Federal Government or of the American policy. In that way I could find out which trend my discussion partner belonged to. The next was as follows: If I noticed that the person showed a certain willingness, I tried to impress him. I traveled first class by train with him. I invited him to have lunch in the diner, I picked him up by taxi. Such things impress people who have nothing, and they will do things to be able to live like that too. In this way the poor situation of the people seeking asylum is exploited.

SPIEGEL: Were you successful?

[Salamah): Yes, I recruited three Palestinians. They received passports, money and were sent to Lebanon. They were supposed to establish contacts with their families again and to spy within the ranks of the resistance movement.

One of them was given the cover name Georg Hanna. His brother has an office in the Al-Fatah organization. He went from here to Damascus with a Mercedes 350 SEL. He wrote me a letter from Damascus: Long live the revolution, the revolution will win. It meant that he had established his contacts as planned.

The second, his cover name is (Mussa el-Fukaha), received DM6,000 from the Israeli Embassy which was paid to an account in the Gelsenkirchen Savings Bank. This man received the money because he had bought a car for himself for DM9,000, of which DM3,000 had been paid already. He, too, was supposed to infiltrate the al-Fatah ranks. He also wrote a letter to me. Also the third, (Said Mohammed Sulayman), is now in Beirut where he has relatives.

SPIEGEL: The three are still running around free?

(Salamah): I have given the names and addresses to 'Abdallah al-Franji, and he has acted. I do not know the details.

Al-Franji: Let us say they are under the protection of the PLO. Yes, they have been arrested. A fourth person is still being observed. We know exactly where he is and what he is doing. I do not want to give the name. He is the one who took (Salamah's) letters from Cairo to Ankara and who brought the money.

(Salamah): He visited me once in Gelsenkirchen and told me: I am well off, I have cars, I fly everywhere, recently went to America on a certain mission.

SPIEGEL: How much money did you get?

(Salamah): Since I have been in Germany, I have received almost DM25,000. I have children I must support who live in Jordan. Expenses were paid extra. Taxi receipts were refunded. I received enough, sometimes 2,000, sometimes 3,000.

They were even prepared to give me a share in a bar in Gelsenkirchen. A Turk was the partner. The rent was DM1,500, the other part was paid by the Turk. The bar was supposed to serve as a contact point with Palestinians. Every day at 1400 I was supposed to be by the phone. The Turk was not permitted to go to the phone at 1400. If somebody called at that time, it was the Israelis who gave instructions.

In addition, they paid for my apartment. I had two apartments. A good one with heating at 191 Horster Street costing DM350 a month, and I had another apartment from the social office at 147 Horster Street.

SPIEGEL: Did you engage in a profession, too?

(Salamah): They demanded that I work so that it would not be noticed that I am better off than others. I worked for 2 months in a central heating firm in Gelsenkirchen-Schalke. When I was dismissed, the Israelis asked me to report to the labor office as being unemployed.

SPIEGEL: And how did you receive your third mission, the al-Franji bureau in Bonn?

(Salamah): When I managed to recruit Georg, I met Jacques at the embassy. He said: Well, the Defense Ministry expresses its gratitude for your work. You have recruited an excellent man.

SPIEGEL: What does Jacques look like?

(Salamah): I estimate him as being 156 centimeters tall, he has brown complexion, somewhat lighter in color than 'Abdallah, he has eyeglasses, no moustache, grey hair that is thinning out a bit on his forehead, and he is about 37 to 38 years old, I believe. He speaks very good Arabic. He only has difficulty with the word habibi (?my dear?), in saying this he produces a guttural tone. Didi wears a wig. He is about 35 to 40 years old.

SPIEGEL: Are you now afraid of the Israelis?

(Salamah): I can imagine that they would like to silence me or seek revenge through my family. I set here as if on hot coals. I have put my fate now into the hands of the PLO. They promised me that they would bring my family into a secure place, and I will fly immediately after the end of this talk from East Berlin to Beirut.

SPIEGEL: You are not afraid that the PLO might punish you?

(Salamah): I expect punishment, and I deserve it. But 'Abdallah al-Franji promised me that there will be just procedures. I was extremely well off, but despite the good life I always had a bad conscience. The final impetus to make an end to it was my acquaintance with 'Abdallah. He helped me, I could not kill such a person.

SPIEGEL: Don't you want to tell Jacques that everything is over now?

(Salamah): (Jumps to the phone): Yes, I will call him.

Al-Franji: (Keeps him back): No, let that be. It is too dangerous.

CSO: 4403

## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### ARAB LEAGUE STATEMENT CONDEMNS ISRAELI AGGRESSION

NC112142 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 2100 GMT 11 Apr 80 NC

[Text] Arab League Secretary General Chedli Kleibi has condemned the Israeli aggression against Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial inviolability, affirming that the Arab League stands by the side of Lebanon. He urged international conscience to intervene and end this aggression.

A statement issued by the Arab League bureau has been issued in Beirut on behalf of Arab League Secretary General Chedli Kleibi, who is currently visiting the Sultanate of Oman within the framework of an Arab tour.

The statement says: Once again the Zionist forces are committing aggression against Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial inviolability which ignoring the UN Security Council resolutions calling on Israel to withdraw from South Lebanon and imposing the deployment of the UN forces in the border zone. In face of the new perils threatening the area, the Arab League firmly stands by the side of the Lebanese state and people, calls on international conscience to condemn the aggression and urges the friends of Israel to intervene to end this aggression in order to preserve peace in the area and the relations with the group of Arab states.

The Arab League secretary general said: While condemning the new Israeli aggression, we cannot but note that this aggression is taking place at a time when the sides of Camp David are negotiating the so-called autonomy--a matter which underlines the gravity of a separate peace, which makes it possible for the Zionist enemy to persist in its aggressive and expansionist policy against all the area's states and makes us turn to the entire international society and call upon it to impose a just and sound solution that guarantees the Palestinian people's legitimate rights and establishes a comprehensive peace in the area.

During his visit to the Gulf states, the Arab League secretary general will be following up developments in Lebanon. He is in continuous contact with his personal representative in Beirut and the Arab League observer at the United Nations in New York.

CSO: 4403

## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### DEVELOPMENT OF ARAB AVIATION COMPANIES SURVEYED

Dammam AL-1QTISAD in Arabic Feb 80 pp 32-35

[Article by Bassam Haydar: "Development of Arab Aviation Companies; Arab Countries Have 33 Airlines That Own 400 Aircraft"]

[Text] The development in the sphere of commercial aviation is taking two directions, the first pertaining to the increase in the number of passengers and the second pertaining to the increase in the number of seats with the aim of realizing the first objective. The fact is that this situation requires at times an increase in the number of aircraft. Were it not for the introduction of the giant airliners into actual service, the number of commercial planes filling the air and belonging to the various aviation companies would be rising stunningly. It is worth noting here that the enormous Boeing 747 airliners in particular, in addition to the Lockheed Tristar plane, the McDonald Douglas DC-10 plane and the Eurobus (I-300), have made it possible to solve a part of the problem existing in this field.

The enormous Boeing 747, for example, has a load capacity that is double that of the other ordinary aircraft. There has been a noticeable increase in the volume of the sales of such aircraft recently because many well-known international airlines have sought to acquire a number of these aircraft because of their profound impact, both financially and in terms of propaganda, to attract larger numbers of passengers, not to mention the implicit strategic goals often involved.

The fact is that the introduction of these giant aircraft into actual service has led to reducing the costs of travel for the passengers and has opened the door of speculation wide for the various companies. Freddy Laker has taken a unique initiative in this regard, reducing the cost of a London-New York ticket to a mere \$140. This has encouraged the other companies to reduce their fares considerably. In the wake of the reduction of the trans-Atlantic travel fares, it is expected that there will be a drop in the cost of air fares between the various European capitals. This reduction has taken place despite the increase in oil prices, and consequently in jet fuel prices, in addition to the rise in the costs of new aircraft and even of used aircraft that are still considered fit for service in accordance with the international safety laws.



The most obvious example of this rapid development in the sphere of commercial aviation inside our Arab world is the tendency of the Middle East Airlines-Lebanese Airways to replace its air fleet completely and to purchase new and advanced aircraft. It is known that the said company owns at present 19 Boeing 707 and Boeing 720 aircraft. The new plan drafted by the company's Board of Directors seeks to replace these aircraft by newer ones within the next 10 years. The costs of this plan, in case it is implemented, will amount to nearly \$1.25 billions.

The current number of airlines in the world is 540 companies, part of which has aircraft operating according to schedule and on set routes while the other part leases its aircraft for chartered flights. These airlines include 33 Arab companies which are owned mostly by the Arab states, with a part owned by private companies. These airlines run regular flights between the various capitals of the world. They also try at times to charter their aircraft for cargo and passenger transportation. The Arab companies own 407 aircraft and employ 40,675 workers distributed over their various commercial, technological and technical departments, in addition to the employees working in their offices in all parts of the world. Recent statistics show that these companies have employed nearly 100 persons to meet the needs of each of their aircraft.

We will try here to review and give a brief idea about these companies.

**The Middle East Airlines:** This company was founded in 1945. In 1965, it merged with the Lebanese Airways. In 1969, this company annexed the International Aviation Company. It is considered one of the most active airlines in the Arab world. It runs flights between a large number of the world capitals and its numerous routes link Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, with the Middle East, European and West African cities. The Intra Investment Company owns a majority of the company's stock, with a share amounting to 62.5 percent, while Air France owns 28.5 percent of this stock. The company's Board of Directors is chaired by As'ad Nasr, who is also the company's general director at the same time. The company employs 4,778 workers and owns three Boeing 707-320C aircraft, 14 Boeing 720B aircraft and a Boeing 707 simulator.

**Trans-Mediterranean Airways:** This company was founded in 1953. For a period of nearly 6 years at the outset, this company worked without scheduled flights and continued to do so until 1959 when it turned into a joint-stock company. It then started to run scheduled flights according to a studied timetable. The owner of this company and its general director is Munir Abu-Haydar. The Trans-Mediterranean Airways is considered one of the most important international cargo transporting airways. It is the first company to establish a route spanning the globe. In 1971, this company inaugurated a route that starts in Beirut and runs through Japan, America and Europe. The company employs 2,174 workers and owns 10 Boeing 707-320C aircraft.

**Syrian Arab Airlines:** It is owned by the Syrian Government. This company was founded in 1961 to replace the Syrian Airways which had been founded in

1946. This company operates in the sphere of passenger and cargo shipping. It runs domestic flights that link the airports of Aleppo, Latakia, Dayr al-Zawr and Damascus with one another, in addition to international flights that link the Syrian capital with the Arab, European and African capitals and some Asian capitals. It participates with the Jordanian ALIA [Royal Jordanian Airlines] in running an air route to New York. It employs 3,000 workers and owns two Boeing 747-S.B., three Boeing 727-200, four Caravelle 10-B aircraft and two DC-6B aircraft.

**ALIA:** The Royal Jordanian Airlines: It is owned by the Jordanian Government. It was founded in 1963 and it operates in the spheres of passenger and cargo transportation. It links the Gulf of 'Aqaba with Amman and runs external flights from the Jordanian capital to Athens, Benghazi, Beirut, Cairo, Bahrain, Damascus, Dubai, Muscat, Casablanca, Baghdad, Brussels, Jiddah, Dhahran, Kuwait, Larnaca, Doha, Tunis, Tehran, Abu Dhabi, Rome, Paris, Frankfurt, Madrid, London, Copenhagen, Geneva, Amsterdam, Vienna, Karachi, Ras al-Khaimah, San'a', Tabuk and New York, the last in participation with the Syrian Arab Airlines. ALIA has the right to land at Dacca airport, (La Gossorio de Janeiro), Buenos Aires and Santiago airports. ALIA has founded a subsidiary called the Arab Wings Company which has three small jet planes that are leased to business men. Moreover, ALIA owns 50 percent of the stock of the Jordanian International Airways and 20 percent of the stock of the Arab Air Services Company. ALIA employs 2,116 workers and its air fleet includes two Boeing 747-200B (Comeby), four Boeing 707-320C, one Boeing 720-B, two 727-200 aircraft and two training simulators, one a 707 Singer-Link type and the second of the (Atkins and Merrill) 727-200 type.

**Jordanian International Airways:** This company was founded in 1974 as a subsidiary of the Royal Jordanian Airlines. It started its first flights in 1975 and it owns one Boeing 707-320C aircraft which it charts for passenger and cargo transportation.

**Iraqi Airways:** This company was founded in December 1945 as a company controlled by the Government Railroad Company. The Iraqi Airways became independent financially on 1 April 1960. The company started running its flights officially in December 1946. Currently, the company's routes cover the Middle East area and Europe, in addition to some Asian and East African countries. The company also runs domestic flights between the major Iraqi cities. It employs nearly 4,000 workers and owns two Boeing 747-200 C planes, three Boeing 707-320 C planes, four (Illution)-760 planes, three Boeing 727-200, three 737-200 C and three Trident 1-I planes. The company also uses training simulators produced by the (Redivon) Company to train its pilots on Boeing 727-200 planes, in addition to another Boeing 727-200 simulator.

**Kuwait Airways:** The Kuwait Airways Company was founded in March 1954 under the name of the Kuwaiti National Airways which took the name of Kuwait Airways in 1957. In 1958, the BOAC [British Overseas Airways Corporation] took charge of the company's technical tasks for 5 successive years. Kuwait

Airways has achieved outstanding successes in a short period. In 1959, it gained ownership of the British International Airways and in 1964 it annexed the Trans-Arab Airways which had become the Kuwaiti Government's property in 1962. Kuwait Airways operates in the spheres of passenger and cargo transportation to 39 cities in 33 countries distributed over the Middle East, Europe, the Far East, Africa and Asia. The company employs 4,697 workers and owns three Boeing 747-200 B aircraft, eight Boeing 707-320 C, one Boeing 737-200 and one Jetstar aircraft. The company will receive shortly four more Boeing 747-200 aircraft and a Singer-Link type simulator for training on the Boeing 747 aircraft.

**The Emirates Air Services:** This company was founded in 1976 under the name of the Abu Dhabi Air Services. It provides air services between the emirates by leasing its aircraft to business men for special trips and by transporting workers of the oil companies operating in the area. The company employs 64 workers and owns one De Havilland plane, two Twin Otter planes, one Cessna 402-B and one Cessna-310 planes.

**The (Hamarin) Gulf Carriers:** This company was founded in 1977 to transport passengers and cargo from Sharjah airport. It started its flights in 1977, employing a D.C. 8. This company hopes at present to get a permit to operate between Sharjah and the British (Gatwick) airports. The company is likely to buy another plane in the near future.

**Gulf Airways:** This company was founded in 1950. Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE have owned since 1974 equal shares in this company. The company runs flights between Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Oman, Amsterdam, Baghdad, Bandar Abbas, Bombay, Cairo, Dhahran, Doha, Dubai, Karachi, Kuwait, London, Muscat, Paris, Sallalah, Sharjah and Shiraz. It employs 3,500 workers and it owns four Lockheed Tristar-200 aircraft, two Lockheed Tristar-1 planes, nine Boeing 737-200 planes, four (Tucker)-27 planes, three Skyvan planes, two Navajo planes, one King Air B-100 plane and two Islander planes.

**Gulf Helicopter Company:** It was founded in 1970 to operate in the sphere of chartering planes for specific flights within the Gulf area. It is now owned solely by the Gulf Airways Company which has purchased the entire stock of the British Helicopter Airways. The company owns six Bell-212 helicopters and two Bell-205 helicopters. The company will receive shortly two more Bell-212 helicopters.

**The Oman Cargo Company:** It was founded in 1977 to charter its aircraft for special trips to ship cargo between the Gulf area and Europe. The company runs at present one weekly flight between Amsterdam, Abu Dhabi and Muscat. It owns a DC-8-55-F.

**(Alimeda): Democratic Yemen Airlines:** This company was founded in March 1971 by a presidential decree to be a national airline controlled by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Its planes operate between Aden, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Jeddah, Sharjah, Mogadiscio, Djibouti, Bombay, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, al-Rayyan and Socotra. It employs 871 workers and it owns one Boeing 707-120 C, one Boeing 720-B and five DC-3 planes.

**Yemen Airways:** It was founded in 1963 under the name of the Yemeni Airlines and this name was changed in 1972 after nationalization of the company to become the Yemen Airways. The Yemen Arab Republic Government owns 51 percent of the company's stock and Saudi Arabia owns the remaining 49 percent of this stock. This company runs domestic flights that link San'a', Ta'izz, al-Hudaydah, al-Bayda' and Ma'rib, in addition to external flights to Jiddah, Sharjah, Kuwait, Muscat, Dhahran, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Karachi, Damascus, Cairo, Athens and Europe. New routes will be inaugurated this year to Bombay and Nairobi. The company employs 750 workers and owns two Boeing 707-320C planes, three Boeing 727-100 C planes, one Boeing 737-200 plane, two DC-6I and one DC-6B planes and five DC-3 planes. The Yemeni Airways is expected to receive in the coming period four more Boeing 727-200 planes and one 737-200 plane.

**Saudi Airways:** The company was founded in 1945 by a Saudi Government decree and started its operations in 1947. This company runs numerous domestic and external flights. The domestic flights include Jiddah, Riyadh and Dhahran. The external flights link these cities with European, Asian and African capitals, in addition to the Arab capitals. The company employs 11,250 workers and owns three Boeing 747-200B planes, one Boeing 747-200-F plane, 10 Boeing 707-320C planes, three D-C-8 planes, two Boeing 720-B planes, eight Lockheed-Tristar-200 planes, two Lockheed-Tristar-1 planes, 17 Boeing 737-200 planes, two Boeing 737-200C planes, three (Fairchild) FA-27 planes, three Gulf Stream-2 planes, two King Air-100I planes, two Cessna 421 B planes and two Apache 235 planes. The company will acquire shortly a number of Tristar-200 planes. It also owns a simulator to train pilots on the Boeing 737-200. The company will also receive shortly a simulator for the Tristar-200 plane.

**Misr Air [Sharikat Misr Liltayaran]:** Until 10 October 1971, this company was known by the name of the United Arab Airlines. It was founded in 1932 under the name of the Egyptian Aviation Company and started its actual operations in 1933. In 1949, the state took ownership of the company which then assumed the name of Misr Air. In 1960, it was given the name of the United Arab Airlines. Its planes operate on domestic and external routes that link the Egyptian capital with Europe, Africa and the Middle East and reach Bombay, Bangkok and Hong Kong. The company employs 9,610 workers and owns seven Boeing 707-320C planes, two Airbus-300 planes, seven Boeing 737-200 planes and two Cessna-207 planes.

**The Nile Delta Air Services Company:** It was founded in 1976 to lease its planes for cargo transportation flights between Egypt and the Arab Gulf. It owns two DC-3 planes and one Piper Seneca plane.

**Nile Valley Airways:** This company was founded to cover some domestic flights, to lease its planes for chartered flights and carry out aerial survey operations. It started flying passengers between Cairo and Alexandria in 1977. But these flights came to a halt when its owner died. The company owns one Herald plane and one (Bartina-687) plane.



**The Pyramids Airlines:** This company was founded in 1977 to provide some air services through leasing its planes for chartered flights connecting Cairo with a number of African and Arab countries and to offer facilities to the oil companies. It employs 85 workers and owns two Y-S 11 I planes and one Airocommander plane.

**Air Sudan:** It was founded in 1946 and started its operations in 1947. It is state-owned and its domestic routes cover all of Sudan. Its external flights reach Kano, Entebbe, Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Jiddah, Cairo, Frankfurt, Bahrain, Athens, Rome, Tripoli and London. It employs 2,557 workers and owns two Boeing 707-320C planes, two Boeing 737-200C planes, five (Fokker) F-27 planes and one Twin-Otter plane.

**Somali Airlines:** It was founded in 1964 as a national airline. The Somali Government owns 51 percent of the company's stock and Alitalia owns the remaining shares. The company started its operations in the same year by running domestic flights to 15 various areas of Somalia. In the following year, the company inaugurated its operations on external routes which currently link Mogadiscio, the capital, with Muscat, Abu Dhabi, Nairobi, San'a', Jiddah, Cairo and Rome. It employs 352 workers and owns two Boeing 720-B planes, two Viscount-600 planes, two (Fokker) F-27-600 planes, two DC-3 planes, one Cessna-402 plane, two Cessna-206 planes and one Cessna-180 plane.

**Djibouti Airlines:** The company was founded in 1971 when the Somali Airlines seized the Djibouti Company that was formed in 1963. After independence, the Djibouti Government got control of 36.33 percent of the stock, Air France controls 32.29 percent of this stock and the remaining shares are divided among a number of individuals and banks. The company's routes link Djibouti with Jiddah, Addis Ababa, Cairo, Aden, Ta'izz and al-Hudaydah. It employs 375 workers and owns two Twin-Otter planes.

**Libyan Arab Airways:** It was founded in 1964 under the name of the Libyan Royal Airlines. It started operating in 1965 and its name was changed after the revolution in 1969. It runs regular flights from Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabha to Rome, Paris, (London), Athens, Casablanca, Zurich, Damascus, Jiddah, Tunis, Beirut, Belgrade, Istanbul, Frankfurt, Algiers and Malta. It employs 2,500 workers and owns ten Boeing 727-300 planes, six (Fokker) F-27-600 aircraft, two Falcon-20 planes and one Jetstar.

**Tunisian Airways:** It was founded in 1948 on a decree by the Tunisian Government which owns 58 percent of its stock. Air France owns the rest of the stock. This company runs flights that link Tunis, (Djerba) and (Monaster) with Algeria, Morocco, the Libyan Jamahiriyah, Egypt, Kuwait, (Syria), Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, France, Italy, Britain, Switzerland, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. It employs 3,144 workers and owns ten 727-200 planes. It will acquire shortly two Boeing 737-200 planes.



**Air Tunis:** It was founded in 1975 as a subsidiary of the Tunisian Airways to secure chartered domestic flights. In 1976, it started operating on fixed and regular routes between Carthage, Tunis and Malta. It owns one Twin-Otter plane, one Queen Air-80-B plane and a French Lama-type helicopter.

**Algerian Airways:** It was founded in 1953 through a merger between the Algerian Airways and the Air Transport Company and became state-owned in 1972. This company operates in the spheres of both passenger and cargo transportation between Algeria and numerous areas in North and West Africa, in addition to France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Britain, West Germany, Switzerland, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, the Libyan Jamahiriyah, Romania, Czechoslovakia and the Middle East. This company also has an extensive network of domestic routes and offers broad services in the field of agricultural pest control. It employs 5,411 workers and owns three Boeing 707-320 planes, six Boeing 727-20 planes, ten Boeing 737-200 planes, three Boeing 737-200C planes, four Conveyor-640 planes, four (Nor-262) planes, 15 Beach Queen Air and 14 (Grumman) planes for agricultural services.

**Royal Moroccan Airlines:** It was founded in 1953 and its present name was adopted in 1957. The Moroccan Government owns 81.73 percent of its stock and Air France and other companies own the remaining stock. The company links Morocco with North Africa, Europe, the Middle East, New York, Canada and Rio de Janeiro. It employs 3,583 workers and owns one Boeing 747-200B plane, two Boeing 707-320C planes, one Boeing 707-320 plane, seven Boeing 727-200 planes and three Boeings 737-200.

**The Moroccan Royal Domestic Airlines:** This company was founded in 1970 to provide air services between the various parts of Morocco. It owns two (Fokker) F-27-600 planes and is controlled by the Royal Moroccan Airlines.

**Mauritanian Airlines:** It was founded at the end of 1922 [sic]. The Mauritanian Government owns 60 percent of its stock, Air Afrique 20 percent and other companies the remaining 20 percent. This company runs domestic and external flights and employs 400 workers. It owns three DC-4 planes, three Fairchild F-27 planes, two DC-3 planes and one Navajo plane.

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## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### TRANSPORTATION SECTOR WITNESSES GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT

Dammam AL-IQTISAD in Arabic Feb 80 pp 44-47, 49-51

[Article: "Development of Transportation Sector in Arab World"]

[Text] In the past 5 years, the Arab world has witnessed a real renaissance in the transportation sector. The direct consequence of the 1973-74 oil price increases have been reflected in the considerable acceleration of the construction and economic renaissance witnessed by the Middle East area and, consequently, the big increase in the imports movement.

As of 1974, the Arab world's roads, naval ports and airports started to experience bottlenecks and, consequently, failed to meet the other procedural steps [al-mu'amalat] required for the enormous quantities of goods flowing into the Arab markets. Today, after 5 years of this change in the economic structure of the Arab countries, the picture is fundamentally, if not totally, different.

Some studies say that if the transportation improvement activity persists at this level, the capacity of the Arab land, air and naval facilities will exceed the traffic being witnessed by these facilities. Contradicting these studies and interpretations, experts say that despite the relative drop in the Arab world's import activity, there is still a vast and urgent need to improve and develop this area's means of transportation. Specific and scheduled budgets have been allocated in this regard to be spent successively and throughout several years to maintain the Arab facilities at the required international level.

This Arab decision means employing large foreign and Arab sectors and opening the door wide for numerous kinds of expertise. The numbers of the air fleets are rising steadily and, on the other hand, the land and sea shipping companies are expanding their operations day after day.

The statistics of the Economic Cooperation and Development Organization say that the Arab import activity increased 60 percent in 1975 in comparison to 1974 and then 16 percent in 1976 and 19.5 percent in 1977.

A report prepared by the organization says that the Arab world's transportation network experienced numerous difficulties as a result of this sudden and rapid increase which peaked between 1975 and 1976 when loaded ships had to wait more than 6 months to get permission to unload their cargo in Jiddah and Dubai ports. The departments concerned were compelled at times to take emergency measures to secure the delivery of some essential and vital commodities. They resorted, for example, to the use of helicopters to unload cement from a ship anchored in Jiddah port.

To deal with this bottleneck crisis, some countries were compelled to slow down for a time implementation of the adopted economic development plans and to speed up on the other hand the expansion of a number of ports, airports and land terminals, in addition to building new ports capable of meeting the growing needs of the local market.

These measures were accompanied by immediate setbacks resulting from the haphazardly methods employed at times. This led to a considerable drop in the volume of goods shipped to the Middle East--a drop amounting to nearly one third in the second half of 1977--and the land transportation traffic experienced a prolonged wave of stagnation.

What, therefore, are the future developments of the Arab transportation activity in the light of these experiences? The setback suffered by the Middle East area is not, in fact, a permanent setback but a transient one, considering that there is a reality that must be taken into consideration, namely that the Arab world is divided into different areas in terms of natural resources and heritage.

For example, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan and Yemen cannot be considered countries with revenues similar to those of the oil countries because the former rely currently to a large degree on foreign aid and on remittances from their subjects who work abroad.

These countries are experiencing currently a relative prosperity that is accompanied by pressure in the sphere of unloading ships anchored in their ports--a pressure caused by the unavailability of the funds required to carry out the modernization and expansion work needed to absorb the new transportation activity. The role of a transit station which these countries play in Arab area, especially the Gulf area, causes their ports to be constantly overcrowded. This phenomenon is expected to last for a long time, but on a smaller scale than in the past.

The oil revenues have enabled the officials of the Arab Gulf states to carry out a program of land, sea and air transportation networks capable of eliminating the present bottlenecks in a few years. Various operations are being carried out at present to enlarge and develop the existing ports. These operations are accompanied at the same time by the construction of new roads, in addition to some ports and airports.

The official statistics indicate in this regard that the UAE ports alone will be able by the end of 1982 to accomodate one third the goods of [imported by] the Middle East area.

The immense increase in the air transportation movement inside the Arab world has caused the Arab airlines and Arab airports to be subjected to increasing pressures. The latest official statistics indicate that the increase in 1977 alone amounted to 17 percent or the equivalent of 15 million or more passengers.

The Gulf states were the first to resort to expanding their airports and services with the goal of absorbing this increase in the number of passengers arriving in and departing from the area. The Saudi Airways is considered at present the biggest airline in the Arab world. It owns more than 50 aircraft, including many of the gigantic Boeing 747 and Lockheed Tristars. Whereas several Gulf airports, such as the Jiddah and Dubai airports, suffer at present from constant congestion and the inability to accomodate the passenger traffic, the experts are inclined to believe that the UAE will not suffer from these bottlenecks as a result of the many airports it has and as a result of their adequate geographic distribution.

This bottleneck in the sphere of air transportation was accompanied by another bottleneck in the sphere of land transportation and this has led to drafting a complete plan to [inter-]connect the Arab world through a vast land transportation network. There is no doubt that the Arab world has been able to realize numerous accomplishments in this sphere in a short time. Whereas there wasn't a single road linking Abu Dhabi and Dubai when the union was established in 1971, any person can now travel by land from the Emirates and Oman to Europe through a network of good international highways, except for a short stretch that is still awaiting completion of the final phase of the asphaltting operations that are in progress currently, as well as the construction of an international highway linking the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with Abu Dhabi. A network of internal roads is being currently built to link the kingdom's various parts with one another. The fact is that the noticeable activity in the sphere of improving the land transportation network has not been confined to the Gulf but has extended to the Arab Maghreb countries, such as Morocco, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Sudan up to the Red Sea.

While this vast expansion is going on in the field of Arab land transportation, the railroads sector is still suffering from stagnation. This sector can play a bigger role in commercial transportation but it is neglected at present. With the exception of Egypt and Sudan, the train is not considered one of the means of transportation used in the Arab world.

More than an Arab country is now preparing detailed studies for the construction of railroad networks covering long distances of hundreds of miles. These projects will be offered for international bides in the next 2 years.



There are still numerous questions that remain unanswered. In the sphere of maritime transportation, for example, the issue of the surplus in the capacity of the present Arab ports is raised. The current bottleneck being experienced by these ports is considered a temporary phenomenon which will be followed by a period of sharp stagnation. A study prepared by a foreign advisory firm indicates that the UAE ports will operate at no more than one third their capacity, i.e. 30 percent of their capacity, with the onset of 1982. This means that 70 percent of their capacity will remain idle. Moreover, 60 percent of their warehouses will remain empty.

Added to this is the fact of the recent reconciliation between Syria and Iraq which has put an end to an estrangement lasting several years during which Iraqi crude oil supplies flowing through the pipeline extending via Syria to the Mediterranean were cut off. Air traffic between the two countries was also halted and land and postal communications between them were also stopped. For political reasons, the railroad linking Iraq with Turkey was also closed because it passes through Syrian territory. The Aden port, also for political reasons, was exposed to grave damage because of the war that erupted between the two Yemens. The vital port of Beirut was put out of action because of the Lebanese war.

There is, in addition to these economic and political reasons, another important reason, namely the failure of the Arab world so far to reach a unified formula for cooperation among its countries--a formula capable of coordinating the work among the various Arab ports and of putting an end to the sharp competition existing between them presently. This competition is considered the real cause behind the squandering of the mammoth human and financial resources enjoyed by the Arab world and the cause preventing this homeland from playing a major and significant role.

#### Bottleneck in International Air Traffic Explodes in Prosperity for Third World

The international air transportation activity is experiencing unprecedented prosperity as a result of the ever-increasing use of aviation as a rapid means of shipping and transportation. Optimism has begun now to prevail among the well-known airlines and the aircraft factories because of the expectations of the enormous profits which will result from this activity.

On the basis of studies and graphs, the only obstacle in the face of these enormous profits continues to be the failure of the world's airports to adapt and to keep up with the expansion in the air transportation activity. It is well-known that some airports refuse to receive large numbers of aircraft because of their inability to provide the service, insure the required safety and work with the required speed. This is why the third world countries that expect a flourishing air transportation activity have begun to develop and expand their present airports and to fit them with various modern equipment. They have also begun to prepare studies for airports which will be capable of absorbing the new growth in the air traffic activity.



Studies expect the use of aviation as a fundamental means of transportation to rise by 8.7 percent, perhaps even more in certain parts of the world, by the onset of 1983. It is also expected that air cargo will increase by 11 to 12 percent until the mid-1980's and then by an average of seven percent [annually] until the end of this century.

Relying on the estimates and studies made in this regard, it is very likely that the number of air passengers will rise from 600 million passengers annually to 1.2 billion passengers before the end of 1985 and then leap to 2.4 billion passengers in 1990. It is evident from this rapid growth in the air transportation movement that the major airports found in the world at present will not be able to accomodate the rising needs in this sphere or to maintain simultaneously the present standard of service.

Passengers using the major airports can notice the increasing pressure and the long delays in completing their formalities. This has become an ordinary phenomenon at present.

Despite the stagnation which was experienced by the air traffic activity several years ago and which allowed the departments concerned to focus on improving the conditions of the existing airports, that effort is not considered sufficient to meet the expected needs.

The airports of the industrial countries, such as the United States, Western Europe and Japan, are experiencing enormous pressure. Vast sums have been allocated for these airports to improve and organize their air traffic because this is an issue that could lead to a real catastrophe if not dealt with rapidly in the next 5 years.

The problems of the developing countries are of a different kind, considering that some of them have no airports, not even initial studies for the construction of airports that provide a minimum degree of safety, whereas others have old airports that have not been modernized for generations. The concept of safety in aviation does not only mean the proper geographic location and long runways capable of accomodating the gigantic airliners. It also means the modern electronic equipment that regulates air traffic, observes its progress and acts as the air guardsman.

Some major airports in the developing countries have begun to install and operate this equipment with the purpose of taking advantage of the expected prosperity in air traffic.

One of the indications showing that the developing countries are aware of the importance of aviation is this noticeable activity in the construction, development and modernization of more than 100 airports in many of these countries. These projects, some of which are already under implementation while others are in the stage of being offered for bids, are a healthy sign. The costs of these projects amount to 20 billions [currency not specified] and they are expected to be completed by 1985. There are also tens of

similar projects that are still under study and that will be offered for implementation shortly. These studies say that by the end of this century, the [aforementioned figure] will jump into the hundreds as a result of the new development projects that are under consideration, in addition to the prosperity that will be experienced by the air traffic activity in these countries.

This flourishing activity ranges from expanding the present airports and modernizing their equipment to the construction of new and modern airports that extend from the land to the shores and the territorial waters of the countries concerned.

One of the most significant obstacles facing the new projects in most of the developing countries is the impossibility of carrying out the scheduled work in the specified geographic locations because the process of expanding and developing the existing airports is considered easier to achieve than the construction of new airports. The civil aviation departments of the developing countries face hard pressures and conditions from the committees concerned with preserving the environment, considering that these committees, which are concerned with the safety of the inhabited areas surrounding the airports, have become a real force that cannot be taken lightly and is very difficult to defy.

It has also become impossible at present to build or expand an airport without taking into consideration the problems emanating from this work, such as noise, environmental pollution and various other ramifications.

Amendments were recently introduced into the laws in force with the aim of compelling the airlines to develop their research for finding the means to reduce aircraft noise and to curtail pollution. These laws will go into force at the outset of 1985 when a new generation of aircraft producing less noise and causing limited pollution will be put into operation.

Environmental pollution and noise problems differ with the different airports and their different laws. Officials in charge of the airports of major and overcrowded cities have failed to expand geographically in a manner compatible with the growth of the aviation movement. This has forced the aviation departments to look for new sites in order to build alternative airports and, on the other hand, to reduce aircraft traffic by night in observation of the noise and public comfort laws.

The issue of building new airports is usually accompanied by intricate measures and exorbitant costs. The further the site of a new airport is from the populated areas in observation of the noise and pollution law, the higher the total costs. The costs are not confined to building and equipping the new airport and to hiring the manpower to operate it. These costs go beyond to more complex problems, such as securing the means of transportation from the airport to the city and vice versa, the construction of a good transportation network, a complex public transportation system (metro, buses and trains) and building hotels and car parks and other public facilities.

Officials expect to cover the costs of the new projects from the enormous revenues expected from the public aviation activity. Some countries where tourism forms a main source of treasury revenues consider participation in advancing financial, legal and other facilities a national must because aviation, in their belief, is a part of their national economy.

Passengers will notice in the near future that a large percentage of the cost of their tickets will be deducted for the concentrated expansion and modernization operations carried out by the departments supervising the airports. This phenomenon will escalate with time.

A new industry, namely that of constructing new airports, has been growing recently side by side with the aircraft industry that has been getting the lion's share of the propaganda and of the limelight.

It is estimated that this new industry will become the industry with the biggest profits in the field of aviation and the competition in this industry will be filled with surprises, such as the PRC's participation in the bids offered in this regard.

A report drawn up at the outset of this year by the U.N. International Civil Aviation Organization says that air traffic will rise by 72 percent in the coming decade, adding that the increase will not be confined to the traditional airlines but that a sizeable share will belong to the developing countries.

The report further adds that the developing countries which will experience this aviation fever will need new airports, longer runways, hotels, special departments to serve the passengers and modern electronic equipment that can secure the service necessary for the gigantic planes which will be put into operation in the 1980's. A small number of the developing countries possess this capability for development and can finance the construction and planning operations. But on the other hand, these countries will not be able to supply their airports with electronic equipment because of the unavailability of the specialized manpower needed to operate this equipment steadily. The industrial countries are trying to enter the developing world's aviation market through this point of weakness.

The report also says that the area which will witness the biggest share of the investment operations in the field of aviation is Africa. Nigeria ranks first with a budget that amounts to one quarter the figure cited by the U.N. report. Nigeria is followed by Zaire which will implement 30 projects consuming 14 percent of the total costs set for the continent's projects. The report gives the same percentage to North Africa while the eastern and western parts of the continent share a percentage amounting to one fifth the set general budget.

The major part of this budget will be spent on the initial studies, blueprints and the advisory services. The remaining sums, in addition to the loans

made available in the form of investments, will be spent on the construction operations. The circles and organizations prepared to advance financial facilities and loans for the construction of airports are numerous and varied. A request for a loan to build or improve an airport in the third world was rarely rejected in the past.

Despite all this, the problems experienced by the third world's aviation development sector continue to be big and numerous. The first of these problems is the lack of the machinery needed to implement the project. This is why any aviation project in the developing countries means a complete project that begins from the point of looking for a suitable and adequate geographic site, goes through the processes of preparing the studies and blueprints, the construction work, securing the equipment and training the specialists and ends with supervising the work for a set period of time.

For these reasons, numerous advisory establishments and specialized industrial groups have flourished in the west, especially in the United States, Japan, Western Europe and Brazil. These groups are capable of offering "comprehensive, complete and ready projects" for implementation in the developing countries.

Whereas the major and economically advanced countries can supply on their own the funds necessary for these projects, the developing countries are compelled to look outward to find the financing necessary for the projects. This financing is available from numerous circles and sources. The U.N. International Civil Aviation Organization, for example, advances funds and the necessary technological assistance to the developing countries. The World Bank and establishments such as the International Development Association also offer funds necessary for such projects.

The financial aid advanced by these circles has included numerous projects implemented in 10 countries, including Colombia, Mexico, Niger, Panama, Senegal, Sudan and Venezuela. This aid has exceeded \$200 millions. The countries concerned are usually required to secure a small percentage of the needed funds while the World Bank supplies the rest through long-range and soft-term loans extending over a period of 20 years for an [annual] interest rate of seven to 8.5 percent. On its part, the International Development Association offers the developing countries interest-free loans extended over a period of 40 years, with (repayment beginning 10 years after granting of the loan).

The western countries also advance financial aid to the developing countries. The major western banks, establishments and companies also display on their part an ever-present readiness and extensive interest in these projects which they consider profitable and good to invest in.

Nairobi offers a good indication of the importance of modern airports to the developing countries. The costs of Nairobi's new airport, which is only one kilometer away from the old airport, have amounted to 60 million dollars.



This airport which has a control tower consisting of 18 floors can serve 10 Boeing 747 Jumbo Jets and 13 Boeings 707 simultaneously and has turned Nairobi into the main terminal in Africa for business men and diplomats. The port has also contributed greatly to Kenya's tourist development. Kenya's revenues from this sector amounted to more than 100 million dollars in 1977, thus exceeding the revenues from the various exports in that year, except for the coffee exports. The number of passengers using the old airport in the same year amounted to 1.5 million passengers.

The new airport was built and equipped to be able to accommodate 2,400 passengers an hour. Nairobi's airport reflects a miniature of the picture of the international aviation activity in the next few years. This port reflects the importance of continued expansion and modernization operations in safeguarding and constantly developing the tourism and air transportation sector.

It is no longer surprising for an Arab airline company to declare the operation of a direct route between the Middle East and New York. Some informed circles say that the date of inaugurating such flights by Concorde planes, which will link the Arab world with Kennedy airport, is the end of the current year.

The Arab airline companies justify this position by stating that the increase of passengers in this direction requires the organization of direct flights and that the final obstacle in the face of such a step is the completion of flight [landing] rights.

This new transformation in the sphere of aviation in the Middle East confirms the soundness of the U.N. International Civil Aviation Organization's report stating that the Arab world is the world's fastest growing market.

The statistics cited by the report expect that there will be a considerable increase in the number of passengers to and from the Middle East area between the present and 1983--an increase amounting to 14 percent annually compared to an increase in passengers amounting to 8.9 percent in other countries of the world. The report also expects the increase in air cargo transportation to amount to the same percentage.

This expansion in the Arab world's field of aviation is justifiable. With the presence of a new road network and an almost nonexistent railroad network, the Arabs view aviation as an ideal instrument to meet the needs of their economic growth. The degree of expansion in civil aviation is reflected in the increase of activity in the area's airports. The figures of a report prepared by the Arab Airlines Organization which includes 18 major airlines in its membership say that the Arab world's airports received more than 15 million passengers in 1977, i.e. with an increase of 17 percent over 1976. The organization's member states [sic] own collectively 190 jet planes of various types, in addition to 25 planes chartered from international companies. This enormous air fleet includes 10 Jumbo Boeing 747 planes, 15 Lockheed Tristars, two Eurobuses, 54 Boeing 707 planes and 21 Boeings 720.

With the continuing prosperity in the aviation activity and with the availability of the funds necessary to expand the aspects connected with aviation, it is expected that the Arab market will witness sharp competition between the aircraft selling [manufacturing] companies. It seems evident that the Boeing Company gets the lion's share, considering that it has more than 180 of its planes divided among the various Arab airline companies. Boeing's medium-size planes, such as the Boeings 727 and 737, are received with big approval and demand despite the enormous pressures exerted by the European aircraft factories to market their [air] buses of A-300 type and (LI-310) type. However, the Boeing Company is still the predominant company through its enormous fleet and its new attempts to block the path in the face of the European medium and small-size aircraft--attempts embodied in the company's production of a number of competitive new Boeings, such as the 767 and 757 types.

This picture is a little different in the sphere of air cargo transportation, considering that there has been a considerable drop in this activity. The reasons here are numerous, the most important being the changes that have taken place in the world economic conditions, such as the drop in the dollar's value and the drop in the demand for oil. These two reasons have led to curtailing the Arab development projects. Added to this is, on the other hand, the improvement in the conditions of the Arab ports and of the Arab land transportation networks which has caused a portion of the goods to be transferred to these facilities.

Economy experts assert that this is a phased and temporary matter and that the air cargo transportation activity will be revived as a result of the Arab world's determination to continue its development and economic programs. It seems at present that the Arab world is eager to develop its airports and that it is giving them priority by allocating more than 2 billion dollars for operations to build, develop and design more than 60 new airports. These projects include developing the new Riyadh International Airport at a cost of 334 million dollars and the new Jiddah International Airport at a cost of nearly 173 million dollars. There are other areas of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where various expansion and development operations are currently underway, such as Dhahran, Bishah, (Jah, Jaff), al-Khafaji, Tarif, Tabuq, Qunfudah, Qaysumah and Yanbu'.

There are also numerous development programs in the stages of planning in each of Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, the Libyan Jamahiriyyah, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Yemen.

In the face of this rapid growth in the air transportation movement, one cannot but ask: Till when will this prosperity in the Arab world continue?

In reply, the experts say that the road before the Arab world is very, very long and that the 1,000-mile trip which started in the 1970's will not halt or come to an end in the 1980's. This area is experiencing rapid progress and growth that are accompanied by an increase in the population and a rise

in the standard of living. All these phenomena, in addition to the other well-known fundamental facts and realities, are the best proof that this area is only at the beginning of the long road.

#### Political Factor Decides Life or Death of Arab Ports

All along the Gulf coast, new ports are being built and the old ports are being enlarged and developed. However, only a few of these ports are being used at present.

The year 1978 witnessed a considerable increase in port traffic accompanied by big activity in ship repair and maintenance work. Last September, the Arab basin for ship repair [presumably the Arab drydock] celebrated the occasion of repairing the 101st ship only one year after the start of work in the drydock for ship maintenance and repair in Bahrain.

The only concern worrying the administrations of these ports at present is how to keep these immense installations in constant operation. In a report drawn up by the (Merrvll and Mitchell) Management and Consultation House, the economies of the area's countries are studied and maritime transportation and the plans to develop and build ports have been analyzed. The report says that by the end of 1982, one half the piers in the Gulf, including Oman and Iran and excluding Kuwait and Iraq, will be idle. The report adds that despite the continuation of port works, for which the allocations are estimated at 5 billion dollars, the rate of idle capacity will vary considerably from one area to another. The report says that the ports of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will operate at only 70 percent of their capacity in 1982 and that this rate will amount to 80 percent in Bahrain. Those drawing up the report believe that the highest rate of idle capacity will be in the emirates where the ports will operate at only 30 percent their capacity.

The Gulf countries are trying to avoid this problem by slowing down this rapid development in the ports sector. Consequently, Abu Dhabi has decided to stop the construction of eight more piers in Sa'id port. The report says that 102 out of a total of 138 piers will be idle in 1982.

It is easy to notice that the situation of the Gulf ports does not apply to al-Hudaydah port in North Yemen and Port Sudan in Sudan where bottlenecks continue to exist and where the development and expansion operations cannot be compared to similar operations in the Gulf area.

Because these areas are considered vital and important, the World Bank has decided to help in expanding al-Hudaydah port and to study the idea of building two new ports in (Makkah) [not Mecca of Saudi Arabia] and Salif. In Sudan, an idea is under study at present to build a port in (Sawaqin) [presumably Sawakin], south of Port Sudan.

The political conditions in the Middle East area are the real and basic factor in the life or death of the Arab ports. The best example of this is

Beirut port which was destroyed and closed for a long time by the civil war of 1975-76 and also the ports of northern Syria which became suddenly congested as a result of the civil war in Lebanon and of the reconciliation with Iraq.

The reopening of the Suez Canal in 1975, after 8 years of closure, is considered a most significant event because it has abolished the role of the Middle East ports as obligatory transit points for the goods heading eastward to the Gulf. The report concludes that the main center for the expansion and growth of maritime transportation will be Egypt because the Suez Canal will regain its historical role. But it is difficult to confirm the conclusions of this report because the Arab world's policies and their constant fluctuations have proven the failure of the studies drawn up so far, and history abounds with examples and proofs of this failure.

#### Return to Railroads as Ideal Solution for Transportation Crisis

Travel by train is considered an ordinary phenomenon in only certain areas of the Arab world, such as the Nile Valley.

The early 1970's witnessed a significant revival in the sphere of railroads which expanded and grew gradually as an indication of the importance of this sector in transportation and communication.

Egypt and Sudan rank first in this regard, considering that they have 3,000 miles of railroads. This railroad network is the longest and most important in the Arab world, even though Algeria has a 2,400-mile long railroad network. Politics and geography play a fundamental role as an obstacle in the face of railroad traffic between the Arab Maghreb countries, such as Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria.

Egypt devotes extensive attention to its railroads and has allocated large sums to develop them and to build new lines. Iron ore, for example, was the main reason behind the construction of a 200-mile long railroad line between the Hulwan steel plants outside Cairo and (al-Bihariyah) Oasis where the iron mines are found. Last year, Egypt announced the construction of three more lines, one with a length of 370 miles to link Qina area on the Nile with Safaqah [presumably meaning Safajah] on area on the Red Sea. The main reason behind the construction of this long railroad line are the phosphate mines.

Sudan's goals in the sphere of railroads are different from those of Egypt's. Railroads in Sudan will help to reduce the distances between the vast cultivable lands that are not exploited yet and will help to reclaim cultivable lands. The train will be consequently used to transport chemical fertilizers and various crops.

In the Libyan Jamahiriyah, the last trace of a railroad line disappeared under the sands in the 1950's. Since then, nobody has taken the trouble to



examine or ask about its fate. Last year, bids were awarded for enormous projects to construct a 127-mile long railroad extending along the coast between Tripoli and Misratah and joining with a 500-mile long line whose aim is to transport iron ore from the areas of (Barrash) and Sabhah in the south to the iron plants in Misratah.

Because of this sudden activity taking place close to it, Tunisia has also decided to renew and repair the old railroad network with the aim of linking the coastal strip with Morocco through the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah to transport goods and phosphate from the mines in the interior to the plants found on the coast.

Syria will focus on developing its railroad lines in the next 10 years so as to use them for domestic and external transportation. It is known that there were four railroad lines in Syria at the time of the establishment of the Syrian state. Those lines were not linked with each other, except through Lebanon and Turkey [sic]. Another line was then built to link Aleppo with Latakia. Tartus was also linked with Homs and Syria thus came to have direct communication with Iraq without going through Turkish territories.

Work is currently in progress on two more lines with the help of the Soviet Union.

Despite the large sums allocated for the other means of transportation, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia seems very interested in the railroads sector. An Italian firm has been engaged to draw up studies and blueprints for a rapid train [line] linking Dammam with Riyadh, the capital. The officials believe that the construction of a railroad line with a speed of 125 miles per hour for the transportation of passengers [will make it possible] to devote the old 360-mile line for transporting freight only. The government has allocated 23 million dollars to repair and carry out maintenance work on 152 miles of the old line.

#### Land Transportation: Natural, Human and Financial Difficulties

A truck driver in the Arab countries faces two challenges, the first being the rugged and difficult terrain and the second being the strong competition from maritime transportation. The Arab governments are spending enormous sums to deal with the first problem by building a network of good international highways. The officials are also leaning toward dealing with the second problem and toward repelling the danger coming from the sea.

The difference between maritime and land transportation costs is still immense, considering that the load of a 40-foot long truck can be shipped by sea from northern Europe to Iraq for a cost of less than 4,000 dollars, which is a lot less than shipping the same load by land.

The owners of land transportation [trucking companies] say that the maritime shipping companies must be compelled to raise their prices by rates ranging from 20 to 30 percent at least, that the road network must be improved and that the transit formalities must be organized so that the competition may become fair and legitimate.

However, nothing of the sort has been realized. Rather, fees on transit traffic by land have increased in Jordan, Syria, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Austria. The total fees paid by a truck driver as a transit tax amount to 20 percent of the transportation fare, i.e. the equivalent of 2,000 dollars. In addition to this bearable [sic] tax, there are series of laws and complications in the various countries through which the driver passes ranging from the driver being compelled to purchase the equivalent of 300 dollars in Turkish currency locally to Iraq's requiring a bank guarantee amounting to 150,000 dollars for every truck.

A report by the International Land Transportation Organization says that no less than 350 trucks pass through the Turkish borders daily and that Iraq relies on land transportation for 10 percent of its imports, compared to 20 percent for Kuwait. Land transportation in Saudi Arabia and the Arab Emirates is negligible for several reasons, the first being the condition of the roads and the most important being the oppressive costs. However, this has not prevented developing the road network in the Gulf area where work is currently in progress to build an internal network and an international network that link the various parts of the Gulf.

Saudi Arabia and Oman face the problem of paving long roads to link vast areas of each country. In Saudi Arabia, a sum of 4 billion dollars has been allocated to carry out a program to develop the kingdom's road network. Until 1976, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had only 15,000 miles of roads, one third of them unpaved.

Oman has also allocated one third its general budget to improve the country's means of transportation and the length of paved roads leaped from several dozen miles in 1970 to 900 miles in 1976. There is at present an ambitious plan to raise this figure to 5,200 miles in several years.

The United Arab Emirates is in fact the only state in which the operations to develop the network of domestic and Gulf roads have covered a long and advanced phase. Statistics say that land transportation will continue to rely on Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Iran. As for the other Gulf countries, the alternative means, such as the low-cost maritime transportation, are still the prevalent ones. Some maritime transportation companies are discussing seriously the idea of setting up their own land transportation fleets to transport goods for these companies from the various Gulf ports to the area's states. Thus, the cost of transporting goods by land from Kuwait to Iraq, for example, will become lower than the cost of transporting them from the ports of Beirut, Latakia or Oman [sic] to Iraq by land. Sharjah will thus turn into a big storehouse from which goods will be distributed by land and by sea to the various Red Sea countries.

## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### BRIEFS

JORDAN-ALGERIA CULTURAL RELATIONS--Yesterday, the education delegations led by Jordanian Undersecretary of Education and Instruction Dhihni Rafit and Algerian Undersecretary of Higher Education and Scientific Research Sharif al-Haj Sulayman discussed matters related to the creation of an executive program for the cultural agreement between Jordan and Algeria. They discussed Algeria's need for Jordanian secondary school teachers as well as arrangements for obtaining them on loan. In the first working session held yesterday, they also discussed the idea of student visitations and the exchange of study fellowships between the two countries. The Algerian education delegation arrived earlier in the morning in Amman for a visit to last several days during which they will hold talks with the responsible officials of the ministry of education and instruction with the aim of consolidating educational ties. Algerian Undersecretary Sulayman, the chairman, explained that the talks will aim at: 1) cementing educational ties, 2) discussing the issues of pedagogy and the use of Arabic as the basic language at secondary, collegiate and graduate-school levels in Algeria, and 3) exploring the possibility of exchanges of students, professors, publications and studies. The Algerian delegation included Ahmad Damraji, secretary-general of the ministry of education, the director general of the civil service, the deputy director of the Arab office in the foreign ministry, and the inspector general in the ministry of national education. The Jordanian undersecretary of education, the Algerian ambassador to Amman, and a group of officials from the Jordanian ministry of education and the University of Jordan had greeted the Algerian delegation on its arrival at Amman airport. Yesterday the Algerian education delegation visited the polytechnical institute of the Jordanian ministry of education and instruction. The delegation was informed of the various fields of specialization taught at the institute as well as the institute's role in training capable technicians to serve locally and in the Arab world. [Text] [Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 11 Mar 80 p 2] 9587

CSO: 4802

PEOPLE SAID TO BE REGAINING CONFIDENCE IN BANKS

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 6 Apr 80 p 3

[Text] On the basis of an announcement of DRA government on Jaddi 8 (December 29, 1979)--the Ministry of Finance has decided to pay for the shares of individual organisations and people held with the banks which have not so far been defrayed, after the nationalisation of the banks, in accordance with the spirit of Decree No. 603 dated Assad 3, 1355.

To throw further light on the decision and provide detailed information to the shareholders an interview was carried by the Kabul New Times reporter with Mohammad Hussein Mansoori, vice president of Banke Millie Afghan as follows:

Prior to enforcement of Monetary and Banking Law, in addition to government, many individuals were also shareholders of the banks.

However, on the basis of the then government's decision the banks' capitals were totally nationalised on 31 Saratan, 1355. On the basis of Article 49 of the Banking Law the individual shareholders should have been paid one year after the enforcement of the Law, but the provision of the Article 49 as was envisaged in the Law could not be fully translated into action. At that time it was decided that those shareholders whose shares do not exceed Afs. 100,000 should be paid the same year, above that amount should be paid in installments over 25 years.

However, the installments were not paid regularly and it was in 1358 that even the payment of installments was blocked under a directive of Finance Ministry without supporting reasons.

But, with the victory of the New Phase of the Saur Revolution, the government along with other urgent and fruitful measures, took a decisive decision under which the price of individual shares in the banks would be restored to its owners.

The Council of Ministers decided that each Afs. 1000 share of Banke Millie be bought for Afs. 750 (75 per cent) and the price of the same should be



paid to shareholders under different categories set during the years 1355 to 1380. Out of Afs. 290,592,000 total price of 387,456 shares bought, only Afs. 78,466,250 was paid during the years 1355-1356 and the rest had remained undecided. Now, under the decision of DRA government, the individual shareholders will be reimbursed.

Mansoori further added. The total price of nationalised shares of the Banke Millie the reimbursement of which was postponed contrary to principles of banking during the tyrannical rule of Amin, amounted to Afs. 212,125,750, belonging to 2,000 individual shareholders and thirty individual organisations.

The banks are required to perform their duties with utmost honesty and according to their declared commitments. However, during the black era of Amin the individual shareholders were denied payments and the honesty and credit of the banks were let down damaging the very financial structure of shareholders and finally the country's economy. This treacherous action of Amin evaporated the confidence and credit which constitutes the basis for all monetary and economic transactions, bringing about a lack of trust in the banking system within the country. However, the wise and timely decision of the DRA government has greatly helped to restore the confidence of the people in the banks.

Likewise, during the oppressive rule of Amin, the properties of the people were confiscated under different names and pretexts. This state of affairs not only led to disorder in the country's economy it also caused the bankruptcy of the banks.

After the victory of the New Phase of the revolution and Finance Ministry's announcement the clients have become confident that their money and properties will be safe from any plundering and continue their business and transactions with total confidence.

CSO: 4920

**WATER, SOIL SURVEY DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED**

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 23 Mar 80 p 3

[Text] The Water and Soil Survey Department has rendered effective services in increasing the production of agriculture and livestocking, supply of potable water and greenry.

A source of the Department talking to a reporter of the Kabul New Times said: Prior to overall studies the soil of every project is analysed at the laboratory of geo-engineering and soil study. The laboratory results are then forwarded to related organisations for use in engineering and water diversion dams, construction of canals and bridges etc.

Bandi Kamal Khan, Kabul Master Plan, Sher Mayee project of Kunduz, Kajaki, Salma and Kokcha dams are undertaken following the technical and soil studies carried out by the Water and Soil Survey Department.

Talking about the eleven months activities of the Water and Soil Department the source said: following measures have been taken in survey and study of subterranean water:

a--Hydrogeological survey has been carried out in 85 different districts of the country in view of determining and obtaining subterranean water and the related maps and reports has been completed.

b--Geophysical survey to determine the subterranean water reserves in Baisqal, Gahlna and Husseinkot, Parwan, has been carried out covering an area of 100 square kilometres. Similarly, survey in Farm No One of Defence Ministry, Karez Mir, and new garrison in Ghazni, covering an area of 41.5 square kilometres and an identical survey in Khakilabad of Logar covering 187 square kilometres has been carried out.

To provide potable water for cities and towns, as well as water for irrigation, for use in industry, a total of 5,872 metres drilling is carried out in the past eleven months.

Likewise, 100 metres geo-engineering drilling has been carried in Sher Khan Port and Dashti Zhari and Dashti Mayee, 145 samples of soil is obtained and sent to lab test.

Near the pump station of Ali Abad, Kunduz, water reservoir in Herat as well as in Kunduz and Kabul cities a total of 33 regular wells will be sunk.

Topo-geodezy survey aimed at studying and designing the irrigation projects has been carried in the following areas:

- Garurgan-Chardara irrigation project.
- Kunduz-Khanabad irrigation project.
- Nahri Karmi irrigation project.
- Laghman province irrigation project.
- Parwan province irrigation project.
- Jurm of Badakhshan irrigation project.

Likewise, the construction blueprints of Bandi Sraj, Ghazni province, Bandi Kharwar, Logar, were prepared and sent to the concerned departments.

Soil survey in view of agriculture has been carried out in following areas of the country:

- Soil survey in Jurm Badakhshan, covering an area of 15,000 hectares.
- Soil survey in Daman district of Kandahar, covering 100,000 hectars area.

Following hydrological activities have been carried out:

Collecting hydrological data from 140 hydrological stations built on various rivers of the country.

Compiling and publishing a hydrological book on Kunduz and Kokcha provinces, and Completion of 400 metres long cableway in Kunduz and Kukcha area.

CSO: 4920

## AFGHANISTAN

### CARPET EXPORTS SHOW INCREASE OVER LAST YEAR

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 31 Mar 80 p 3

[Editorial: 600,000 Sq. Meters Carpet To Be Exported This Year"]

[Text] This year 600,000 square metres of carpet is planned to be exported, showing an increase of 100,000 square metres compared to last year.

Talking to a reporter of Bakhtar, President of Export Promotion Department said, with the victory of the Saur Revolution, especially after its New Phase the ground is prepared for further promotion of exports especially carpets and rugs and our Revolutionary government is striving to further expand its trade abroad.

The Commerce Ministry will, for the first time, publish the carpet catalogue with the cooperation of International Trade Centre, a vital publicity mean in marketing the traditional Afghan exportable commodity.

Similarly, further publishing the Afghan carpets, participation in international trade fairs, holding of seminars, establishing contacts with foreign firms for consolidating the present and finding new markets for promoting exports, is part of the programs of the Commerce Ministry for implementation of which stern measures have been taken and desired results have been obtained so far.

Replying another question the President of Exports Promotion Department said during the past year some 25 tons thread produced in Kandahar Woolen Textile Mill was distributed on experimental basis to carpet producers in Aqcha and Andkhol and recently a protocol for 60 tons carpet thread was concluded with Kandahar Woolen Textile Mill so that the same is provided to carpet weavers.

He expressed hope that through cooperation of the related factories, all carpet thread required by carpet producers is supplied locally. The supply location of carpet thread will have valuable role in developing the carpet trade and enhancing its value.



Referring to the washing and design of carpet, he said, previously a considerable amount in hard currency was being spent when Afghan carpet was washed in countries like Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland and Britain. However, this problem is now solved to a great extent with the help of foreign advisors of Commerce and Mines and Industries ministries. As is now the local carpet washing plants with satisfactory capacity and quality is ready to do the same service.

To improve the designs in accordance with the requirement of foreign markets, a number of graphic samples are prepared with the cooperation of technical personnel of Carpet Exporters Guild and put, freely, at the disposal of carpet weavers, he added.

Replying another question he said the major markets for Afghan carpets are Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, Britain, Saudi Arabia, US, France, Holland, Italy and Sweden, however, recently Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has also added to the list where Afghan carpet is exported. In 1979 the protocol for export of Afghan carpet to Soviet Union worth eight million dollars was concluded. Similarly, in 1980 the export of the same will continue on the basis of the same protocol. Likewise, another protocol for export of Afghan carpet to Soviet Union worth 1,262,850 dollars was concluded recently under which export of Afghan carpet will begin during current Afghan year.

The President of Export Promotion Department noted that the Afghan carpet is improved considerably, qualitywise, and it has gained added reputation. There is now a great demand for Afghan carpet in international markets, as it is produced from pure hand-picked wool and is handwoven.

The price of carpet is determined by demand and supply in the markets. At an average a high quality Maur Afghan carpet is sold for Afs. 9,900 per square metre, a medium quality for Afs. 6000 and third degree quality Afs. 4500 and above. The Qarqeen carpet, lowest as far quality, is sold for Afs. 1300 to Afs. 2,000 per square metre.

The Export Promotion Department has always been ready to participate, with the help of International Trade Centre in international trade fairs and Afghan delegations are sent abroad for finding new markets.

CSO: 4920

## SECOND PHASE OF PARWAN IRRIGATION PROJECT COMPLETED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 31 Mar 80 p 3

[Text] With the completion of the second phase of Parwan Irrigation Project an additional 9,500 hectares of barren lands will receive ample amount of water.

A source of the Ministry of Water and Power talking to the reporter of the Kabul New Times added: The Parwan Irrigation Project is one of the carry-over projects within the Ministry of Water and Power of DRA. The project to supply adequate water for irrigation of 15,300 hectares of water scanty land and 9,500 hectares new land in Parwan province located mainly to the East of Charikar city.

The completion of this project, as envisaged in the plan, will considerably augment the agricultural outputs in the area, strengthening the economic structure of farmers and veniculturists, raising living standards of noble and toiling people of Parwan and playing a vital role in greening the province.

The source further said that generally speaking the project consists of three phases, the first phase covers the following construction:

A 62 metre long diversion dam over Panjsher River with three gates each ten metres long and 4.25 metres high.

The maximum flowing capacity of the dam is 12,000 cusecs and in normal days 935 cusecs.

The 24.22 kms main canal with a capacity of 129 cusecs, has been built extending from headway to Charikar city. The salient features of the main canal are two siphons, concrete and iron, each with 2.5 metre diameter, with a capacity of 28 cusecs built under the Salang river bed.

Another siphon, with same specifications, and with the final capacity of 27 dusecs 1,255.88 metre long and 38.5 pressure, is built under Ghorbtand river bed.

The hydro-electric plant is built at the end of main canal and beginning of eastern canal in Chairkar city, having three generators each with a capacity of generating 800 kws and with a total capacity of 2,400 kws.

The water-pump plant with 800 litres water a second is built at the mouth of the canal.

The eastern, southern and western canals with 16 cusecs and 17 kms, nine cusecs and 21 kms, three cusecs and 22 kms length respectively have been constructed.

In the course of the main canals a total of 480 small and big construction such as bridges, culverts, siphones, control gates etc. has been completed.

Parwan province is one of the lush and green provinces in the country, yet water is scanty in some areas. The Parwan Irrigation Project was undertaken to rectify this situation, said the source

The Parwan Irrigation Project will not only regulate the irrigation network in the area, 2 400 kws power is also generated there, for illumination of the city.

A maximum of 3,000 people and minimum of 1500 people, including officials, wage earners, skilled and unskilled, are engaged in the project.

CSO: 4920

## ALGERIA

### BRIEFS

NAVAL SHIPYARD--At Mers-el-Kebir the National Marine Engineering Office (ONCN) has entered its production phase following 6 years of personnel and technical preparation. ONCN, which presently employs almost 1,000 workers, specialists and engineers, expects to expand its infrastructure and work force in the next few years to about 5,000. Its design and research offices--with its production workshops--constitute the nation's first marine engineering school, currently engaged in putting out 2,500 hp tugs, large-capacity floating docks, and a 50-ton barge (ordered by the National Explosives Office, ONEX). [Excerpts] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 1 Apr 80 p 2]

CSO: 4400



ARAB CROPS NEAR HEBRON FUMIGATED, DESTROYED

TA150912 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 15 Apr 80 p 2 TA

[By Jerusalem correspondent]

[Text] Fumigating planes hired by the "Green Patrol" have fumigated and destroyed thousands of dunams of crops belonging to Arab villages near Mount Hebron. The intention was to destroy crops illegally cultivated by West Bank Arab villages on the western side of the "green line." However, according to the military government's claims, hundreds of dunams were mistakenly fumigated and destroyed in the West Bank as well.

Some of the fumigated land is located in the Halhul District. The mayor of Halhul yesterday said that the heavy fumigation also poses a danger to the villagers' health. The military government is looking into the affair. It was reported from the Knesset last night that Knesset member Haya Grossman (Mapam) is to submit parliamentary interpellations on the subject to the agriculture and defense ministers.

The affairs began a few weeks ago when members of the "Green Patrol" found out farmers living west of Hebron were also cultivating land on the Israeli side of the green line. Further checks revealed that the phenomenon was also taking place on the south of Mount Hebron, near the villages of Yattah and (Samo'a). Thus, planes were hired to fumigate the fields a few days ago. However, the planes flew into West Bank territory and mistakenly fumigated hundreds of dunams on the eastern side of the "green line". Crops cultivated by Arabs of the West Bank on Israeli territory were also fumigated and destroyed some time ago near Kafr Qasem, east of Petah Tiqva.

Arabs from the villages of Idnah, Bayt Awla and Tarqumiyah have also complained about the fumigation. It has so far emerged that hundreds of dunams sown to wheat and rye and a few dunams of olive plantations were fumigated west of Mount Hebron. The illegally cultivated fields which were fumigated are much large and comprise several thousand dunams.

CSO: 4805

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

TRADE DEFICIT--The trade deficit has gone down 12 percent in the first quarter of this year, compared to the same period last year. The spokesman for the Central Bureau of Statistics reported today that the balance of imports versus exports in the first 3 months of 1980 reached \$647 million, compared to \$732 last year. The Finance Ministry noted today that if the trend of increased exports and decreased imports continues as in the first 3 months of this year, the trade deficit for this year will decrease by \$500 million. [Text] [TA132009 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 13 Apr 80 TA]

CSO: 4805

# REACTION TO JUNBLAT'S INITIATIVE ON NATIONAL UNIFICATION

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 3-9 Mar 80 pp 18-19

[Article: "The Phalangists Are Afraid; Sham'un Is Not Disturbed"]

[Text] When Walid Junblat, speaking for the Lebanese National Movement and the National Front, issued his appeal for an entente to begin with an alliance bringing together the forces represented by Mr Junblat, former President Sulayman Franjiyyah, former Prime Minister Rashid Karami, Raymond Iddih, and the Christian Democrats, observers paused to take a close look at these forces and at the initiative to combine them into a single political bloc--or at least a group of close and harmonious blocs.

One of the leaders of the "Lebanese left" made this comment on the appeal: "It provides an opportunity to establish a true equilibrium in the country which goes beyond political life itself to cover the army, the various sectors [of the nation] and other factors. The leftist leader went on to recall certain phases of "impossible equilibrium" from 1976 to 1980, and to remind of the "lessons of failure" which led to the recent problems.

## Story of the Equilibrium

In this leader's opinion, the conclusion of Lebanon's civil war prevented the joint victory of the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese National Movement. For this reason, President-Elect Ilyas Sarkis found himself free of any National Front pressures, especially following the death of the leader of the Lebanese National Force, Kamal Junblat.

Instead, President Sarkis found himself facing two nonharmonious forces, although it was their temporary and exceptional alliance that helped him attain the presidency. President Sarkis went through a short period in which he attempted to reconcile the demands of these two nonharmonious forces--which were Syria and the "Lebanese Front." But Israel's intrusion into Lebanese political life and its establishment of the "petty state" of Sa'd Haddad in the south made such a reconciliation an impossible task. Because there was no National Lebanese force capable of putting pressure on President Sarkis, he found himself leaning more toward a gradual siding with the "Lebanese Front." Thus, the equilibrium was upset more and more and the attainment of

reconciliation and stability became more difficult. This is because reconciliation and stability can only occur on the basis of true equilibrium such as that created by President Fu'ad Shihab in 1959. Shihab brought forward Pierre al-Jumayyil for the Christians and Rashid Karami and Kamal Junblat for the Moslems and secured a true equilibrium, thus insuring a true stability for the country which lasted throughout his term and that of his successor, President Charles Hlu.

This leftist viewpoint adds that all the misfortunes resulted from the disturbance of equilibrium at its foundation. This led to establishing a "lame" army, gradually transforming the Arab Deterrent Forces into "traffic police," and turning the Palestinian resistance movement into a captive of legitimate fears of liquidation.

#### Search for Political Weight

Those concerned with Lebanese political affairs recall that the "National Movement" put forward several reconciliation plans and several initiatives for the establishment of a broad front. However, the absence of Kamal Junblat prevented these appeals from winning serious attention among the rest of the politicians and factions. In 1978, an idea gained currency which called for the establishment of an alliance between President Rashid Karami and the National Movement to give the appeal greater political weight. However, a number of things prevented this from happening. Foremost among them was the fact that former premier Karami "counted to a thousand" before undertaking any step. Moreover, he was aware of all charges leveled against the late leader Kamal Junblat because of his alliance with communists, Nasirites, Syrian Nationalists and other leftist groups. This made Karami keep his distance from the National Movement and keep his line of retreat open, as the Lebanese saying goes.

For this reason, the leaders of the Lebanese left insisted that the current appeal be issued by Walid Junblat, a Druze leader and son of Kamal Junblat, as well as head of the largest of the National Movement parties, the Socialist Progressive Party.

Numerous efforts were made to convince Walid Junblat to deliver the statement of the National Movement personally. These efforts were made by George Hawi and Muhsin Ibrahim, the secretaries general of the Lebanese Communist Party and the Communist Action Organization of Lebanon, respectively. 'Asim Qanisu also took part in these efforts.

Despite the difficulties brought up by Mr Junblat as preventing him from performing this mission, everyone confronted him with a fait accompli: If you really want to act to save Lebanon, this can only occur through the establishment of true equilibrium, and true equilibrium requires political weight which only you can provide. Walid Junblat consented, though he maintained his reservations and his inner desire to avoid taking a definite position on a struggle which he portrays as not concerning the Lebanese National Front.



In the end, the now familiar events transpired. Walid Junblat issued his appeal for a broad nationalist initiative which primarily includes former President Sulayman Franjiyyah, former Prime Minister Rashid Karami, Raymond Iddih and the "Christian Democrats."

#### The Lebanese Front's Interpretation

But what does the other Lebanon say? "East Beirut" sources hold the view that the Lebanese Front received Walid Junblat's initiative with two different faces: a gloomy and fearful Phalangist face and an expectant and at the minimum undisturbed Sham'un-ist face.

The Phalangist sources do not hide their fear of the response of Franjiyyah, Iddih and Karami to Junblat's initiative. There are many reasons for this, including the following:

1. A bloc such as this uniting President Sulayman Franjiyyah and Iddih, who are separated by gulfs of aversion and disagreement, is capable of dealing a real blow to the Phalangist Party's plan for complete control over the Maronite sect. Raymond Iddih represents the view of the silent Maronite majority, which has many reservations about the war, the militias and the parties; and Sulayman Franjiyyah is the leader of the Maronite north who is working with full force to prevent the Phalangists from reaching his territory. An alliance between these two men (which would be reinforced by the geographical connection between Raymond Iddih's district, Jubayl, and the Maronite north) would open a powerful front against the Phalangists. In addition, it would open the door for the silent majority to say what they have to say out loud.
2. The alliance between Franjiyyah and Iddih would strengthen former President Camille Sham'un's position over Pierre al-Jumayyil and the Phalangist Party within the Lebanese Front, inasmuch as Sham'un would appear to be a mediator between the two extremist Maronite blocs. Franjiyyah's and Iddih's bloc with Walid Junblat has perhaps caused Sham'un, who knows the right way to tackle the matter, to be drawn into a position close to that of the bloc. Relations between Sham'un and Franjiyyah are good, and when Sham'un went to Ihdin to console former president Franjiyyah over the loss of his son, Tony, he whispered in Franjiyyah's ear: "What could I say, a refugee in the Phalangist areas." Therefore, Sham'un's opening up to the native of his district, Walid Junblat, provides him with a sensible solution to his problem with the Phalangists. It is generally known that Sham'un is building a palace in his village, Dayr al-Qamar, which is close to Walid Junblat's village of al-Mukhtarrah. Asked if he was not afraid that this palace would meet the same fate as his palace in al-Sa'diyat, which was destroyed during the war, Sham'un replied that the neighborhood of the Junblat family did not frighten him because they are a pure and patriotic Lebanese family. This remark is considered an indication that "something positive" exists between the two leaders of the al-Shuf district.

3. The presence of Karami and Junblat in one national bloc with Franjiyyah and Iddih would strike down the possibility of an Islamic voice [of objection from] the Lebanese Front. This includes former Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam, some of the prominent individuals in the Islamic bloc, and Druze politicians such as Shaykh Muhammad Abu Shaqra and Faysal Arslan. Moreover, it would nullify the Maronite wager on the Shi'ite sect as an element which might split the unity of the Islamic position, since the Shi'ites would find it safer to join such a moderate bloc which would make Syria happy without angering President Sarkis. The fact is that Husayn al-Husayni, one of the most prominent Shi'ite politicians, has recently taken positions which are very close to those of Walid Junblat. Mr al-Husayni was supposed to have attended the press conference at which Junblat delivered his conciliation statement, but he pleaded illness because he probably did not want to get involved until the picture became completely clear, since there is safety in being slow!

4. Lastly, the alliance of these four leaders, backed by politicians of the Shi'ite sect, would make President Ilyas Sarkis' position more complex, because he would be unable to deal with the Phalangist Party as the sole political force which has materialized on the Lebanese scene.

As for sources representing former President Sham'un, they actually offer the same interpretation. However, they differ in the way they define their position, because they see it as serving Mr Sham'un at the expense of the Phalangists, who have continued to be the main source of his fear, as we have seen.

In the end, there remain many questions about Walid Junblat's enthusiasm for his plan and the possibility of solving the pending difficulties between Raymond Iddih, on one hand, and former president Sulayman Franjiyyah and those close to Damascus on the other. These are questions which must be answered in order to understand the moves of Lebanese politics in the coming phase, including the fate awaiting Walid Junblat's initiative, and the role of the National Movement, which has been restored by this initiative to the forefront of events after a long absence.

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PRESIDENT OF SUPREME ISLAMIC COUNCIL DISCUSSES NATIONAL UNIFICATION

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 3-9 Mar 80 pp 14-15

[Interview with Shafiq al-Wazan, president of the Supreme Islamic Council in Lebanon, by Kamil Fa'ur: "It Is a Tax Which Must Be Paid"; date and place not given]

[Text] Shafiq al-Wazan is president of the Supreme Islamic Council in Lebanon and a member of the Islamic Grouping, which includes former prime minister, members of parliament political personalities. The Supreme Islamic Council constitutes a cultural and political framework in which many organizations, groupings and associations are linked, and, in this sense, constitutes quite a broad popular framework. Shafiq al-Wazan says that the Supreme Islamic Council reflects Islamic opinion in Lebanon because of its universality, since the three Islamic sects are represented in it. This makes it similar to ideological party organizations.

The first president of the Islamic Council following its establishment in 1953 was the late Husayn al-Uwayni, the former prime minister. He was followed by Muhammad Kani'u, who was succeeded by Shafiq al-Wazan.

Mr al-Wazan says: "At first we were pursuing entente, then we switched to security ahead of entente, and now, all of a sudden, we are back to entente before security. I am afraid that the potential for the achievement of entente is still lacking. In any case, in the event of withdrawal of the [Syrian] Deterrent Force, it would be impossible to conceive of any alternative security force besides the Lebanese Army, in spite of our objections to it. As for Palestine and the Palestinian cause, Lebanon has paid much, and it is obligated to pay whatever else it can."

[Question] Domestic political activity in Lebanon these days is centered around the matter of entente. Apparently, the state is serious about studying and putting forward an integrated formula for entente. How do you see this matter?

[Answer] Entente is being proposed in this urgent manner in the wake of the decision to concentrate the Arab Deterrent Forces. This is very interesting, because it restores to the forefront an approach which we as well as other organizations called for in the past, and which the administration pursued back in 1978. In March of that year, contacts were made by the president and prime minister with political and party leaders. As efforts and proposals were getting under way, we were surprised by new events that made the issue of entente secondary and started a new phase calling for "security before entente." Thus, we forgot the issue of entente and switched over to the issue of security. With regard to the matter of security, attention was inevitably focused on the issue of the defense law. The defense law followed a laborious and difficult course through political and parliamentary wrangling and was finally approved.

In the meantime, many issues sprang up, including deterioration of the situation in the south, Lebanese-international relations at the UN Security Council, and the need to call on legitimate Lebanese forces to implement UN resolutions in the south. There was pressure to send the Lebanese army to the south. We in the Islamic Council were not, and are still not, completely satisfied with the process of building the army in a way that we can entirely feel confident about it. In spite of this, and in the face of necessities, we consented to the Lebanese army assuming security duties in the south. Other security considerations then required the state to seek the help of the legitimate forces elsewhere. Again, we reluctantly agreed in principle. We thought that even though there might be flaws in the structure of the army, we would in time be able to rectify them and improve the situation. But we were then surprised with the recent decision to regroup the Arab Deterrent Forces after withdrawing them from Beirut.

Thus, we could not possibly conceive of the departure of legitimate forces from certain positions which could be filled by illegitimate forces. Therefore, we put forward the principle that the replacement of the Arab Deterrent Forces be carried out through legitimate Lebanese forces. We stipulated that this should occur in Beirut as a whole, followed by the remaining areas of Lebanon.

However, official and unofficial contacts and efforts between Damascus and Beirut once again laid emphasis on entente as the avenue to the solution of all problems, and as the first and last objective. When matters are proposed from this standpoint, no one can reject the proposal of entente.

[Question] But there are still the conditions...

[Answer] The feasibility, the climate and the conditions for reconciliation remain to be determined. It is these things which we must attend to. It might be easy for us to provide the proper climate through our efforts and through mutual agreement that the Lebanese, today, yearn for the realization of entente. But the feasibility of and the necessary conditions for reconciliation are still the fundamental issue.



[Question] What, then, are the Islamic Council's conditions?

[Answer] In this connection, it is hard for us to say that we have conditions for an entente. We say that there are basic self-evident truths upon which Lebanon was founded, and one cannot be negligent about these.

We all know that Lebanon was founded in 1943 on a certain basis. The different sides agreed that this country would not be a center or corridor for colonialism. The sacrifice of the Moslems, in particular, was implicit here. They considered themselves to have a certain mission, namely, to maintain the Arab character of this country and not to make it either a center or corridor for colonialism. The Christian nationalists, including the Maronites, believed in this destiny, adhered to it and acted accordingly when they participated in all the steps of independence.

Thus, one of the foremost self-evident truths is that we want to keep Lebanon united in land, people and institutions, and we want to keep it independent, free, sovereign and Arab. When we say Arab, we mean all dimensions and connotations of this word. For Lebanon is a part of this Arab world. It is in the Arab League and it is an Arab state. Lebanon was the first country to participate in the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, and it rendered many services for the Palestinian cause based on its belief in Arab nationalism and its Arab commitment.

Getting back to entente, it [has to be built on] Lebanon's Arab identity. This nation is still directly affected by the Palestinian problem, especially since the Palestinian presence took on a military character when the Palestinian decided to participate directly in the struggle for their return and liberation. This imposes on Lebanon a certain contribution to this cause. This contribution can change as circumstances change. But the important thing is for everyone to realize that Lebanon believes in this cause and is working in its behalf.

[Question] The resistance is adhering to the agreements it has signed with the Lebanese state...

[Answer] As long as the Palestinians are present on Lebanese territory, it is inevitable that this presence be organized in a way that will give it effectiveness and avert all harm to Lebanon insofar as this is possible. I do not imagine that Lebanon could participate in this cause and escape all harm as a result of this. It is a tax which has to be paid, and Lebanon is paying it directly in a manner estimated to be many, many times more costly than if it were engaged in a war against Israel.

It remains for me to state also that Lebanon must undergo a certain change, through amendments or reform. What is self-evident in this regard is the strengthening and effective application of democracy. This proceeds from two fundamental principles: the principle of equality and the principle of liberty. I mean responsible liberty.

[Question] Based on all of this, where does your viewpoint correspond and where does it conflict with the statement issued by the National Movement, which it termed a statement of a "comprehensive solution" to the crisis?

[Answer] Just today I was visited by Kamal Shatila along with a delegation from the Federation of Forces of the Working People. He gave me a report which included a look at the principles of entente. When I examined these principles, I found that they were in conformity with the principles announced by Walid Junblat on behalf of the National Movement, the principles announced previously by the Islamic Council, as well as the principles adopted by the Islamic Grouping. I feel that the ideas and premises are generally the same. With a certain amount of coordination and cooperation, a single joint formula can be found.

[Question] If the principles are so close together, what separates the positions?

[Answer] We believe that when an entente is proposed, we can only welcome it. But when certain circles take the initiative in putting forward a formula for an entente, it must cover everyone. Up to this point, the initiative has been limited to the National Movement. It also appears that the Federation of Forces of the Working People (Mr Shatila) is pursuing its own initiative.

[Question] In his frequent statements, Pierre al-Jumayyil says that the Islamic authority which the Christians find acceptable to negotiate with is the Islamic Grouping. What would you say is the secret behind this courting of the Islamic Grouping?

[Answer] I do not feel that this is merely a case of affection. Pierre al-Jumayyil still holds on to his old concept of entente. He believes that there are two sides: the Christian side and the Islamic side. But I say that time has produced forces in the Lebanese arena which believe in formulas and premises that are far removed from the sectarian basis which has plagued us in Lebanon. A third side has emerged in the country. It is neither Islamic nor Christian, and covers the entire spectrum of party orientations. We cannot drop this side from the calculation, even if it were mistaken in its thinking. The phase of reconciliation must encompass all sides. And here I ask: Does the Lebanese Front represent all the Christians in Lebanon? Definitely not. There is the movement represented by Sulayman Franjiyyah, there is Raymond Iddih's movement, and there is the movement of independent Maronite representatives, who constitute half the Maronite representatives in parliament. These individuals are independent of the aforementioned Maronite movements and have views which are entirely different from those of the Lebanese Front.

Moreover, we cannot actually view the appeals of Pierre al-Jumayyil seriously. We still recall that Shaykh Pierre did not acknowledge the existence of an Islamic negotiator at the start of the events. He used to ask repeatedly: With whom do we talk? Then we hear him say that the Islamic Grouping is the [qualified] negotiator! This means that al-Jumayyil's words express

specific tactics which he does not expect to lead to reconciliation. We [sarcastic way of saying He] call for support of legitimacy and then we cut it down every day and prevent it from making progress. The parties of the Lebanese Front take the place of the state in everything. This is equivalent to establishing a partition administration.

[Question] If we may, let's move on to another point, namely Lebanese-Syrian relations. There is much discussion of this topic. There are some who say that the special relationship with Syria must continue on the basis of written security and economic agreements. What is your view on this matter?

[Answer] First let me stress the special relationship between Syria and Lebanon. This is an established historical situation which has continued up to the present time, as indicated by the lack of diplomatic representation between the two countries--or the "twins," as they are called. Twins share the same sensations, and they constitute one entity.

I recall that at the start of the events, when the Syrian Army went into Lebanon for the first time, I was in Damascus for an appointment with Syrian officials. Following my inquiries and discussions, they told me that the decision to enter Lebanon was more serious than the decision to launch the October War. This is an indication of the importance that our Syrian brothers attach to the situation in Lebanon and to Lebanese security, and to the repercussions of the Lebanese situation in Syria, especially under the present circumstances.

This calls for the need for complete coordination between the two countries.

[Question] Something more than mere coordination is at stake...

[Answer] When I say coordination, a 2-fold question arises. Will it be a written coordination or an unwritten coordination? Of course, what is important in all of this is the intention and the strength of trust between officials of the two countries.

[Question] In the context of a discussion of entente, some have proposed the need for the formation of a political action [reconciliation] government to pave the way for an entente in place of the present government. What is your view on this matter?

[Answer] A government of political action is equivalent to reconciliation. We must have reconciliation in order to form a government of action. The question is: Has reconciliation reached the point where we can turn to a government of political action? I believe the answer is that we do not know yet!

[Question] We would like to ask you, what is your view regarding the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan?

[Answer] Our premises in the Supreme Islamic Council are fundamental premises. We are against any military intervention in other countries, especially in the international domain. We previously issued a statement in this regard

in which we expressed our sorrow at this intervention. We stated that we were against the American intervention in Lebanon in 1958, and against the military alliances that Britain and America tried to set up in the 1950's. Today we oppose this intervention in Afghanistan, not because we are against the Soviets and on the side of the Americans, but because our position is closer to the Iranian position. We do not believe in either East or West, but in principles and values, and we act on their basis. We want each country to live in freedom and dignity, and we want the principles of right to prevail, since they are the source of strength for weak nations.

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## LEBANON

### PHALANGES-LIBERALS ALLIANCE TRACED, ANALYZED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 17-23 Mar 80 pp 31-34

[Article by Firas Hamdan: "Background and Dimensions of Militia Clashes; Phalanges and Liberals: Agreement in Policy, Disagreement Over Control"]

[Text] Despite the alliance existing between the Liberal and Phalanges parties, military and political disagreements emerge between them every now and then. Do these disagreements constitute a renunciation of the alliance or are they a part of its character? To what extent do these disagreements affect the relationship between the two parties and what are the limits of this relationship? Defining the relationship between the two parties requires two things:

First, a return to the origins of the two parties, their character and their position in the Lebanese policy.

Second, a followup of the relationship between the two parties, especially during the Lebanese war which was characterized by the creation of alliance fronts and by the opening of battlefronts.

#### Points of Difference Between Two Parties

Regarding the first point, it is noticed that there is difference between the two parties in several aspects, the most important being:

1. The partisan character of each of the two: Whereas the Phalanges is a party that has produced leaders, we find that the Liberals is a "leader" that has produced a party.

The Lebanese Phalanges is a party that was founded in 1936 as a result of the effect of the "rising" Nazism at the time and it was formed in the mold of one of the Nazi parties, namely Franco's Phalange Party. The Lebanese Phalanges Party was formed on a structural organization governed by bylaws that define membership conditions, leadership succession and definite goals. This party was characterized by a para-military organization and fascist and racist ideas. Its leader had no political position before the eruption of the war [World War II]. This leader's political position grew with the growth of the party and was linked with the party.

As for the National Liberal Party, it was founded by Camille Sham'un around the end of his presidency (1957) in an attempt to organize his groups and establish ties with them in the wake of the escalating and violent opposition which developed against his regime. With its structure and ideology, the Liberal Party was similar to the bourgeois parties in Europe and was not governed by specific and firm organizational relations.

The chairman's personality has been and continues to be the basis of the party, considering that Camille Sham'un held an important political position in the Lebanese political life before the rise of the party and this position dominated the party after its formation. What is more, the party was confined to the conventional partisans at the end of Sham'un's term in office. The party's organizations were not founded till after the beginning of the Lebanese war (1975).

Thus, the Liberals have been Sham'un's party while Pierre al-Jumayyil has been the chairman of the Phalanges Party.

2. The second point of difference is the base of the two parties. Whereas the Phalanges Party has relied on a Christian, specifically Maronite, base, the Liberal Party--despite its Maronite base--has Lebanese extensions among the other sects.

The Phalanges Party, by virtue of the rise of its leader in a purely Christian area and by virtue of its religious ideology, has spread among the Christian circles only. This is made evident by the parliamentary elections because the party's candidates have been confined to the areas with Christian majority (the first district of Beirut, al-Ashrafiyah, Northern al-Matn, Kasrawan and, at times, Jizzin).

By virtue of the rise of its chairman in a mixed sectarian area and by virtue of this chairman's Lebanese leadership prior to the emergence of the party, the Liberal Party has not been content with its Christian bases, even though they constitute its mainstay. This party has spread, even though on a limited scale, in the other areas and among the Muslim sects. It is noted that its candidates for the elections come from mixed areas. This party has even had its Muslim candidates (Mahmud 'Ammar, Bashir al-'A'war and Kazim al-Khalil).

3. The third point of difference is connected with the struggle for leadership of the Maronites. At the time when Sham'un was the leader of the Maronites and Lebanon's president in their name, al-Jumayyil was one of the Maronite leaders.

The first, i.e. the chairman of the Liberals, is trying--by virtue of his history, his popular base and his Lebanese leadership, to entrench his Maronite leadership whereas the second, i.e. the chairman of the Phalanges, considers himself, by virtue of his partisanship, the more suitable leader and is trying to impose his leadership on the Maronites through the unity of his partisan base.

4. The fourth point of difference, a point concluded from the above, is connected with the difference between an old party with a new chairman (the Phalanges) and a new party with an old chairman (the Liberals).

5. The fifth point of difference lies in the social structure of each of the two parties and in the class interests that they represent. Whereas the Liberal Party represents domestic feudalism and big capitalism in the capitalist operation and whereas its followers come from the middle class and above, the Phalanges Party represents fundamentally the interests of the higher sectors of the small bourgeoisie and is trying to find a place for itself in society's structure. This party depends on the marginal factions in society [sic].

6. Perhaps the sixth point of difference stems from the course of the growth of the leaderships of each of the two parties. The Sham'unite, and consequently the Liberal, leadership emerged under the canopy of the old colonialism (British and French) and took part in the independence battles against the French. This leadership had relations with the Arab rulers sympathizing with the English.

Al-Jumayyil, and consequently the Phalangist, leadership emerged under the canopy of Nazism which embodied the ideology and interests of the neo-colonialism which was opposed to the British and the French. This leadership was affected by Nazism and when the latter fell in World War II, the Phalanges continued to grow with the rise of the neo-colonialism (the United States).

This difference between the two parties does not mean that they are in conflict because they do agree on the general and basic lines. Each relies on a Marunite base and reflects its interests and goals. The two parties also agree in their position of hostility toward Arabism and progress and cling to a Lebanon based on the "1864 Protocol" which was amended by the National Charter.

#### Shihabism and Relationship Between Two Parties

This difference between the two parties--a difference founded on a broad base of agreement--emerges clearly when we follow up their positions in the Lebanese political life. This difference and agreement took their practical form in the wake of the 1958 events and of the subsequent rise of Shihabism on the debris of Sham'un's regime.

Despite the Phalangist position of support for Sham'un in the 1958 revolution--a position based on a firm policy which believes in the sanctity of the first presidency--the Phalanges Party tried to become the alternative to Sham'un after the end of his presidency and when Shihabism imposed isolation on him.

After Fu'ad Shihab was elected president of the republic in 1958, after Shihab's political boycott against Sham'un and after the break of the alliance

between Shihab and Raymond Iddih (1960) because of the growing power of the Duxieme Bureau, Shihab projected Pierre al-Jumayyil as the representative of the Marunites in the absence of their leaders and included al-Jumayyil in the successive Shihabist governments to secure a Marunite cover for his regime. This participation constituted the beginning of al-Jumayyil's rise in the leadership of the Marunites at the expense of Sham'un's leadership which was isolated from the government. This participation by al-Jumayyil and the services it performed provided an opportunity to strengthen the position of the Phalanges Party.

Even though the Phalanges Party was not the party making the decision on Sham'un's isolation, it was the main beneficiary from this isolation. This is what prevented the disagreement between the two parties from reaching the point of conflict, especially since the Phalanges Party tried to play a dual role: It did participate in the government but was not the ruler and it did support Shihab but did not oppose Sham'un. The party also supported Shihab's development policy but did not support his Arab policy.

This duality took the Phalanges Party out of the circle of those isolating Sham'un and kept this party on the borderline between Shihab and Sham'un, especially since the party refrained from extending its activities into the areas considered a Sham'un's domain (al-Shawf in particular).

The decline of the Shihabist era after the Intra crisis (1966) and the June (1967) defeat provided a suitable occasion to reduce the Phalanges relationship with Shihabism and to develop it with the Liberals, thus giving rise to the Tripartite Alliance (Sham'un, al-Jumayyil and Iddih) in 1968 as a Marunite front opposed to Shihab.

As it was a declaration of stripping the cover from the Shihabist regime, whose president at the time, Charles Hlu, was not altogether remote from this attempt, the Tripartite Alliance was also a declaration of the start of the war against the changes produced by the June war by either taking advantage of entrenching the flaw in the Arab balance on the Lebanese arena or by preparing to face the post-war developments, the most prominent of which was the growing strength of the fedayeen action.

However, the relationship of alliance between the Liberals and the Phalanges through the Tripartite Alliance disintegrated when the alliance achieved its goals of eliminating the power of the Duxieme Bureau, lifting the isolation from the Liberals and delivering the presidency of the republic to Sulayman Franjiyah.

However, the breakdown of the alliance did not lead to hostility between its parties, especially not between the Liberals and the Phalanges, because the coordination of positions continued during Franjiyah's term.

With the onset of the Lebanese war (1975), the relations between the two parties entered a new phase imposed by the nature of the war and by the needs of the military action on the one hand and the stages of the war and the change in the balances of power on the other hand.



The Phalanges Party took part in 'Ayn al-Rummanah massacre (13 April 1975) which signaled the start of the war, as it took part in all the battles that followed the massacre until the end of September 1975, whereas the Liberal Party steered clear of the battles until October 1975. What is more, Camille Sham'un was appointed minister of interior, with tacit national Palestinian approval, in the (salvation) government which was headed by Rashid Karami.

Whereas the slogan of political isolation reached with its impact the Phalanges Party, the Liberal Party benefited from its nonparticipation [in the battles] by having the old isolation lifted from it. In the first months of the war, the Liberal Party tried to become the Marunite alternative and to tip the scales in favor of its leadership--scales previously inclined in favor of al-Jumayyil.

The refrainment of the Liberals from participating officially in the war and the distinctive position of the party chairman were not due to a fundamental difference in the position toward the Palestinian presence or toward the national growth [presumably the growth of the national movement] but due to two reasons:

First, the ugliness of the crime committed by the Phalanges militia--a crime which the Phalanges themselves, not to mention their friends, could not defend, especially since a general national position confronted the Phalanges and imposed isolation on them. Participation by Sham'un with the Phalanges would have narrowed Camille Sham'un's margin of maneuverability.

Second, the weak military preparedness of the Liberals, in comparison with the Phalanges, because the Liberal Party had not yet provided the minimum requirements for actual participation in the fighting, whether in terms of armament, training or organization.

This tactical difference from the Phalanges earned Sham'un several advantages, the most important being:

His participation in Rashid Karami's government through which he realized personal and political benefits.

Lifting the old political isolation imposed on him, considering that he was reconciled with Karami and Junblatt and that he met with the resistance leaders more than once.

But this difference between Sham'un and the Phalanges was not total because they had the same position toward the military government and toward the slogan of political isolation. Moreover, this difference did not last long because as of the end of September 1975 the Liberal Party began to take an actual part in the battles and a new alliance formula emerged. This formula had two mainstays, namely the Phalanges and the Liberals, and support from the then President of the Republic Sulayman Franjiyah. This alliance was

expressed at the time in the Marunite summit. The alliance also reflected itself in the birth of the Freedom and Man Front in al-Kasklik (31 January 1976) and in the subsequent Marunite summits held on 26 March 1976, after al-Ahdab's coup, on 13 April 1976 (after President Franjiah moved from B'abda to Kasrawan) and on 22 May 1976. Several factors played a role in strengthening the alliance between the two parties and in making the Liberals take part in the war at the end of 1975 and the beginning of 1976. The most important of those factors were:

The escalating intensity of the battles in the fall of 1975.

The second disengagement agreement on the Egyptian front (the Sinai agreement).

The sectarian polarization by the Phalanges.

The fall of al-Damur and al-Sa'diyat (the strongholds of Camille Sham'un).

The alliance formula was developed after the disintegration of the legitimate army and when the war entered a decisive stage in May 1976. The Lebanese Front then emerged as a political leadership of this alliance which included, in addition to the two parties, the Marunite religious orders, President Franjiah (al-Maradah Brigade), Edward Hunayn, Charles Malik and Fu'ad Afram al-Bustani. The front also produced a unified military command called the Lebanese Forces.

The disintegration of the Lebanese army on the one hand and the transformation of the war from a war of positions to a "war of subdual" [harb al-ijtiyah], especially in Mount Lebanon in the spring of 1976, on the other hand had a big role in bolstering this alliance.

After the entry of the Deterrence [Forces], the front leaders tried to strengthen their alliance and three famous retreats were held, namely al-Bir retreat (21-23 January 1977), the Ihdin retreat (27 August 1977) and the Zgharta retreat (February 1978).

However, inasmuch as those retreats bolstered the alliance and benefited from what was considered a victory for them after the entry of the Deterrence, the retreats were also an attempt to heal the undeclared split which developed among the parties involved and which focused on three points of disagreement:

The relationship with Israel.

The protection money levied on the citizens.

The relationship with the neighboring Arab countries, especially Syria.

The disintegration in the alliance began to emerge in the wake of the Zgharta retreat, with the absence of President Franjiah from the front's [subsequent] meetings and with his taking distinctive positions toward the issues of

disagreement. The disintegration took its practical form in the May and June battles between al-Maradah and the Phalanges, the most prominent battle of which was the Phalangist militia attack on Ihdin which killed 33 supporters of Franjiyah's, including his son Tony, on 13 June 1978. Even though Franjiyah left the Lebanese Front, the two other parties--the Phalanges and Liberals--remained in it. However, their alliance did not prevent them from clashing with each other numerous times.

The background of the clashes between the two parties can be understood if compared with:

1. The political developments in the area, the most outstanding being:

The transformation developing in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the wake of al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.

The emergence of Sa'd Haddad's state in the south and the semi-declared relationship between the isolationists and Israel.

The Syrian-Isolationists confrontation.

2. The inclination for fascist domination by the Phalanges Party and its endeavors to subdue all the forces to its power. This inclination emerged in:

The clashes with al-Maradah in Zgharta and the killing of Tony Franjiyah.

The clashes with the Armenian parties which, though not members of the Lebanese Front, were friendly toward it. The Phalanges Party tried to evict the Armenians and to subdue them in several battles (February 1978, September 1978, May 1979 and October 1979).

#### Battles of Allies

A review of the most significant clashes between the two parties will perhaps shed light on the background and dimensions of the conflict:

During the battles that took place in the two-year war, numerous "individual" clashes occurred between the two parties, especially during the control of the homes of the evicted or the seizure of public establishments and warehouses. However, the intensity of the external battles obliterated those clashes. Perhaps the most significant of those clashes was the one which took place during the blockade of Tall al-Za'tar (the summer of 1976) when the forces of the two parties alternately attacked the heroic camp tens of times and when every retreat was an occasion for one party to hold the other party responsible for the failure. This is why both Bashir al-Jumayyil and Danny Sham'un hastened to declare the role of their forces in storming the camp. Moreover, during the war, the Phalanges Party repeatedly accused the Liberal Party of failing to take part in the fighting and of confining its participation to sharing the booty, thus claiming sole credit for the

fighting. Meanwhile, the Liberal Party was blaming the Phalanges for involving the Christians in a war while failing to provide them with the means of steadfastness.

In February 1978, clashes erupted between the Phalanges and the Liberals in Brummana, leading to the death of Danny Sham'un's and George al-Asmar's aides.

On 11 May 1978, the Phalanges Police (S.K.S.) arrested 100 liberals in al-Mu'amaltayn who were, according to the Phalangist claims, smuggling hashish and demanding protection money from people passing in the area. Armed Liberals retaliated for the arrests by attacking the Phalanges office in al-Badawi, by blocking off and burning tires on the roads and burning a part of al-Funduqiyah building in al-Dikwanah. The declared outcome was the death of two persons (a Phalangist and a Sham'unite) and the wounding of 16 people.

On 4 and 5 June 1978, clashes erupted between the Liberals and the Phalanges in al-Hadath because of disagreement over hanging posters and pictures belonging to the Phalanges Party in an area with a Sham'unite presence. The clashes did not stop until the leaderships of the two parties (Bashir al-Jumayyil and Danny Sham'un) intervened and until the pictures and the slogans causing the disagreement were removed.

On 19 July 1978, clashes took place between the two parties in Antilyas and led to the death of one person and to wounding a number of others.

On 5 September [no year], a big battle with various weapons erupted between the two parties in the area of al-Zalqa, Jall al-Dib and Antilyas and then extended to Junyah. The outcome of this battle was 14 people killed or wounded. The causes of the battle were, according to some people, personal differences and, according to others, disagreement over the plundering of a warehouse of canned foods. According to a third story, the disagreement was over the transfer of the Phalanges radio to a spot close to the positions of the Liberals.

Perhaps the May 1979 clashes between the two parties were the most violent.

On 11 May 1979, clashes broke out between the two parties in 'Ayn al-Rummanah and Furn al-Shubbak and spilled over to al-Zalqa and a number of villages in Kasrawan and Byblos. Those clashes lasted 4 days and resulted in the death of no less than 25 people, the wounding of tens of others and in material damage described by Bashir al-Jumayyil as exceeding their losses in the 4 years of the war. Popular resentment also reached such a level that made the women of Furn al-Shubbak stage a demonstration demanding that the government intervene.

It was evident during the battle that the Phalanges were trying to root out the Sham'unite symbols in the area (al-Hanash and al-Zaghlul).



The declaration of the unification of the two parties (15 May) failed to put an end to the clashes, thus Camille Sham'un and Pierre al-Jumayyil were compelled to ask the government to insert its army between the combatants of both sides.

On 20 May, the clashes were resumed in the barren plains of Eyblos (al-Laqluq, al-Qamu' and al-'Aqurah) where each side had its military positions. The Liberals were stationed in Qal'at al-Bayda, Sayyidat al-Qarn and Zuhur al-Bahr and the Phalanges in al-Majdal, al-Khasfah and Shir Mar Yuhanna. The clashes lasted one week and heavy weapons were used in them. The effects of the clashes extended to the coast (Safra and al-'Aqabah) and the Beirut-Tripoli highway was cut off.

The cause for the disagreement was the struggle for the area's leadership between Al Hashim, the family which has its relations with the Liberals, and the Phalanges Party. The clashes did not stop until Sham'un and al-Jumayyil declared the mobilization to confront the Syrian danger coming from the east and embodied in the endeavor of the Arab Deterrence Forces to open a road from the city of Ba'labakk area to this area.

At the end of January and the beginning of February 1980, clashes broke out between two parties in the barren plains of Eyblos and extended to the coast. Various weapons were used and the Phalanges Party was able to seize a Liberals barracks in 'Anaya and Saint Sharbil's Hermitage in the area. The Phalanges also attacked and took control of a number of Liberal offices in the area's villages (Duma, al-Batrun, al-Kufur, Futuh Kasrawan and Ihmij).

On 7 February, the clashes extended to al-Batrun when some residents of Bsharri whose sons had been killed by the Phalanges in 'Anaya stormed the Phalangist center in Dayr Balla and killed two Phalangist. According to the claims of the Phalanges, the causes of those clashes were the acts of harassment to which the Liberals subjected the area's inhabitants.

The outcome of those clashes was 14 people killed, dozens wounded and big material damages. However, the political outcome has been increased Phalangist control and reduced Liberal positions in the area. At the level of the relations between the two parties, the clashes led to the retirement of Dorry Sham'un, the Liberal Party secretary general, from political life and to the appeal by Danny Sham'un, the party's defense secretary, to the army to interfere so as to protect the Christians from the transgressions of the militias.

It seems from all the clashes between the two parties that the causes revolve over two things:

Disagreement over protection money and smuggling.

Struggle for control.

Perhaps linking the struggle between the Liberals and the Phalanges with the other struggles in the areas under the controls of the militias demonstrates that the Phalanges have been the pivotal point in these struggles. The Phalanges were the ones who clashed with the people of Zgharta and with the Armenian parties and they are the ones who are constantly clashing with the Liberals. This observation leads to the main cause of the conflict between the Liberals and the Phalanges--a cause found exclusively in the Phalanges' plan to impose the one-party control. This plan is being implemented by Bashir al-Jumayyil who rejects any multiplicity in the party's internal organizations.

Shaykh Bashir, the commander of the Phalanges camp and the head of the Lebanese Forces, proceeds on the basis of purely fascist concepts to impose his control and to build his state. It is not incidental that the battle theaters between the two parties are the positions in which the Liberal Party has successful influence ('Ayn al-Rummanah, Furn al-Shubbak and the barren plains of Byblos) and that the aim of these battles is to uproot the Sham'unite presence in these areas.

The Phalanges take advantage in their struggle with the Liberals from several facts that shackle the Liberals and Sham'un, their chairman.

The first of these facts is the war in Lebanon, the psychological state prevailing among the supporters of both parties and characterized by hostility toward the Arabs and fear of the Arabs and the belief that separation of the two parties will make them an easy prey for the Palestinians, the Syrians and the Muslims who harbor "evil intentions" toward them.

The second of these facts is Sham'un's loss of his fundamental and historical base (al-Sa'diyat and al-Damur). Sham'un lives the life of a refugee in areas shared with him by the Phalanges and his breaking away from the Phalanges will cause him to be without a base to protect him or will force him to take refuge in the Islamic areas.

The third of these facts is Sham'un's embroilment with the Phalanges in the relationship with Israel. This makes breaking away from the Phalanges difficult.

However, these facts that shackle Sham'un may not prevent him from pouncing on his ally, at least politically. Else, he will have to wait for a slow death on the hands of Shaykh Bashir.

Ex-President Sham'un and his party are facing a dilemma and Sham'un's political survival requires him to overcome this dilemma. The clashes between the two parties will either lead to his capitulation, to accepting the position of the front's honorary chairman and to abandoning his party and his supporters to the mercy of the Phalanges. Perhaps the retirement of his son Dorry is a prelude to this capitulation. However, this will mean the end of the political role of the Sham'un family and an end to what Sham'un wants to leave for his sons or, at least, for Shaykh Pierre's sons.

Or these clashes will lead to his deserting patience and to his joining Ex-President Franjiyah's front where some areas adjacent to the ghetto [not further specified] could constitute a possible and reasonable base, such as Byblos, for example, or 'Ayn al-Rummanah-Furn al-Shubbak area.

This requires a public disavowal of what is being said about the relationship of his party with Israel. Perhaps the general developments which will take place in the area will be the factor that will make Sham'un opt for one of the two possibilities.

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## LEBANON

### TRIPOLI MUNICIPAL WORKERS STRIKE OVER WAGE INCREASES

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 5 Mar 80 p 4

[Article: "In Protest of Their Being Denied 'Differentials,' Tripoli Municipality Workers and Employees Declare Strike"]

[Text] Tripoli--Tripoli Municipality workers and employees went on strike yesterday in protest of yesterday's decision by the Ministry of Interior providing for giving the municipality's workers and employees wage differentials as of the beginning of 1980 and not the retroactive differential in accordance with the decision setting the date of the public sector's wage increase as of the beginning of July 1979.

The workers and employees staged a sit-in strike in the municipality premises while a delegation representing them and including Engineer Emile Khallat, the acting mayor; Marwan al-Sayyid, the general financial controller; 'Abd-al-Majid Matarji, the acting chief of the Personnel Affairs Department and Bahjat al-Shamrukh, chairman of the Sanitation Workers Union, met with the governor of the north, presented to him the position of the workers and employees toward the decision and appealed to him to convey the workers' position toward this decision that has denied them the increases for 6 previous months whereas Beirut Municipality has gotten all the determined increases.

The delegation pointed out that the previous law [presumably meaning decision] stipulates that all state and public sector workers be given the differentials for one half 1979 and that the position taken by the Ministry of Interior squanders the rights of the Tripoli Municipality workers and employees who continued to work under the various extraordinary conditions which have been experienced by the country.

#### Governor's Position

The governor said after the meeting: I have familiarized myself with the two decisions issued by the Ministry of Interior in this regard. The decision concerning the Beirut Municipality has given the workers the increases dated as of July 1979 whereas the decision concerning the Tripoli



and al-Mina' [port] municipalities gives the increases as of the beginning of 1980. There is absolutely no place for comprehending or accepting this discrimination. If there has to be any discrimination, then it should be in favor of the Tripoli and al-Mina' municipalities, considering their efforts and the services they have preformed at the various levels.

The governor added: I will contact the Ministry of Interior and the officials to convey to them this viewpoint. I will attach my position to the outcome of these contacts and to the degree of the officials' response and of their reconsideration of this decision that denies the workers and the employees their legitimate rights.

#### Workers Federation Supports Employees

On the other hand, the Federation of Workers in the north has supported the position of the Tripoli and al-Mina' municipal workers and their rejection of the Ministry of Interior's decision. Midhat Kusa, the federation chairman, has considered the decision a premeditated plan by the officials aimed at creating confusion. He has said: There should be no summer and winter at the same time and under the same roof because the Tripoli Municipal Council approved the decision on the basis that it would be applicable as of the beginning of July [1979], as issued by the cabinet.

He added: The Federation of Worker Unions supports the Tripoli and al-Mina' municipal workers and will contact all the officials concerned to amend the decision and to give the workers their legitimate rights as earned by the Beirut Municipality workers.

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LABOR, INDUSTRIALIST LEADERS DISCUSS THEIR DEMANDS

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 9 Mar 80 p 4

[Interviews with Dr Nabil Ghusn, Chairman of Council of Commissioners of General Federation of Workers, and with Dr Fu'ad Abi-Salih, Chairman of Lebanese Industrialists Association; Ghusn: "Strike Will Be Staged If Increase Isn't Decided Upon"; Abi-Salih: "Disagreement With Workers Is Out of Picture and State's Role Is Fundamental"]

[Text] The issue of higher wages demanded by the General Federation of Workers and of the labor-economy dialogue is preoccupying these days the labor circles and the business owners, especially since the federation has set 6 April 1980 as a final date for giving the wage increase which, as demanded by the federation, amount to 41.43 percent and for granting the other labor demands. Else, the federation will resort to staging a general labor strike.

AL-SAFIR has interviewed both Dr Fu'ad Abi-Salih, the chairman of the Lebanese Industrialists Association, and Dr Nabil Ghusn, the chairman of the Council of Commissioners of the General Federation of Workers, and has discussed this issue with both men. The paper has also discussed with them what the business owners and the workers have done within the framework of settling this pending issue.

The chairman of the Lebanese Industrialists Association has asserted that the main motive that has made it a must for the business owners to meet with the workers' representatives is the economic and security situation under which the country lives.

He has also announced that the [economic] organizations are prepared to meet the workers' demands in case the state helps the organizations by meeting their financial and tax demands and other demands connected with reducing the [production] costs, provided that agreement is reached with the federation over a set timetable.

Abi-Salih has denied the presence of fundamental differences among the heads of the economic organizations over the issue of the dialogue, pointing out

that the emerging sensitivities are the result of a difference in some viewpoints concerning the free economic system and the limits of state intervention in this system.

Abi-Salih has expressed his hope that the standard of the Lebanese workers will be raised, asserting that he will seek to realize this hope in case the state advances the aid required in the current phase.

The chairman of the Council of Commissioners of the General Federation of Workers has been frank in underlining the federation's intention to stage the general strike if the demands are not met and the wages are not rectified. He has also urged the state to avoid social upheavals.

Ghusn has gone even further when he stated that the Council of Commissioners of the General Federation of Workers will bring those whom he has described as delinquents inside the federation to account.

Ghusn has noted the importance of the ongoing dialogue with the economic organizations under the current conditions, asserting that the success of this dialogue is tied to the extent by which the rightful demands of the working class, led by the demand for increased cost of living allowances, are met.

Dr Ghusn has also called for adopting the principle of issuing a periodic indicator, at least once annually, in accordance with which wages are increased by decree without having to go through the paths of dialogue, tensions and social upheavals.

Ghusn stressed the role of the state as a neutral middleman in reaching positive results through the dialogue, asserting that the federation is capable of staging the strike in case the dialogue fails.

The text of both interviews follows.

Following is the text of the interview with Ghusn:

[Question] Dr Ghusn, the labor movement is seeking a dialogue with the economic organizations for the first time, even though the previous experiences have not been encouraging. Don't you think that there is a new transformation in the federation's policy and what is this transformation?

[Answer] The change in the federation's policy has been embodied in the federation's move to take scientific [sic] steps. This is an objective, or a general policy, for which the federation's Council of Commissioners aspires and plans. Practically, the actual crystallization of this step has been embodied in the working paper presented by the Followup Committee to the Council of Commissioners in the absence of George Safar, the Executive Council chairman, who was in America.

In the wake of this paper, the Council of Commissioners adopted its decision to revive the call for convening the general congress of workers after taking clear decisions on the issue of inflation on the one hand and on determining the minimum wages scientifically and realistically on the other hand, thus outlining a complete course of demands.

Insofar as dialogue with the economic activities is concerned, any unionist knows perfectly well that production is a partnership between the worker and the business owner and this partnership must continue if we want tangible prosperity for the country.

The dialogue I understand is tantamount to realizing rightful demands for the toiling class--demands spearheaded by wage increases to counter inflation. In my view, these increases cannot, as is always the case, be realized without a social upheaval reaching the point of strikes because of the failure of the business owners generally to understand social development on the one hand and the drop in the currency's purchasing power on the other hand, keeping in mind that they do understand these issues when they touch on their interests.

This is why an end must be put to this phase which is creating chaos in the country and why efforts must be made to move to a fundamental demand on which the Council of Commissioners has taken numerous decisions. This demand calls for setting up a special committee of experts and technicians concerned with providing an inflation indicator from time to time, at least once a year, so that the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Council of Ministers may rely on this indicator to issue periodic decrees setting the wage increases and applying to all the Lebanese in order that the labor movement may not be forced to resort to negative stances all the time.

Therefore, I realize that agreement with the industrialists or with business owners on this issue will lead to stabilizing the situation, keeping in mind that the periodic indicator which we have mentioned is operative in all parts of the world.

As for negotiations between workers and business owners, they are desirable and must continue, but according to definite demands that the labor movement is seeking to realize within the framework of preserving the country's economic prosperity.

[Question] In the speech he made to the labor conference [not further specified], George Safar, the chairman of the General Federation of Workers, urged that the demands of the workers be linked with the demands of the [economic] organizations. What is your opinion of this step?

[Answer] As for absolute linkage of the demands of the General Federation of Workers with the demands of the business owners, I am against such a step because it is incompatible with the labor demands. However, I do support dialogue with the business owners for implementation of the federation's demands in a programmed manner that guarantees these demands, considering that they are emanating from urgent popular demands.



Dialogue must take place. But agreement or lack of agreement depends on the particulars of the dialogue, considering that both sides have rights and duties which must be balanced.

[Question] What do you mean by programming the demands?

[Answer] When I spoke of programming I meant that the federation and the organizations must have a complete plan to attain their goals.

[Question] What is the role of the state in this dialogue and in this programming?

[Answer] The state's role should be that of a middleman.

[Question] But the state is an employer, or rather the biggest employer!

[Answer] The state must be a middleman and a middleman must be neutral. Consequently, the state must understand the basic facts of life and must seek to reconcile these facts so that it may secure the rights of the working class "from the business owners while preserving the prosperity of industry, commerce and the other economic sectors."

[Question] Does this mean that there is a possibility for you to negotiate with the state over the inflation indicator percentage?

[Answer] In my view, there should be no bargaining whatsoever over the inflation indicators for a basic reason, namely that the cost of living increase is not an increase in wages but a correction and a compensation for the purchasing power that the individual income loses. In other words, it means restoring the purchasing power of the worker's wages to its level before the rise in the cost of living.

I want to point out here that the worker shoulders the burdens of inflation under which he lives for a long time before he can make up for a part of this inflation. This being the case, the worker always lags behind inflation and keeps struggling in a vain attempt to catch up with it.

This is why I believe that on this premise, the federation is ready not to demand wage increases if the prices can be stabilized. But when the state and its agencies fail in this task, the worker has no choice but to demand wage increases.

As for bargaining over the inflation indicator percentage, it is my opinion that this percentage should be sacred, considering that it is scientific. Periodic decrees, even if issued only once a year, must give this percentage as an increase in wages. Bargaining over this percentage will affect the daily life of the worker and of his family.

Supposing, for example, that an animal consumes 10 kilograms of barley daily, can we imagine that, because of the present situation, such an animal can be satisfied with 5 kilograms only?

If this is impossible for an animal, then how can it be acceptable where man is concerned?

[Question] The organizations believe that the wages cannot be raised by the percentage demanded by the federation. Do you think that the federation will insist on this percentage?

[Answer] The reality is different from words. However, this difference must be rectified and the rectification must come with the help of the state if it wants to have stability in the country and wants to build good citizens.

[Question] In case the dialogue fails, is it your opinion that the federation can resort to adopting a decision to strike in order to achieve its demands?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the federation is capable of adopting a strike decision and of carrying it out successfully, as proven by the strike of 6 April 1979. The federation's capability stems from the fact that the labor demands are rightful popular demands that represent the interests of the majority of the Lebanese people.

[Question] On whom does the final decision concerning the outcome of the dialogue depend?

[Answer] The final decision is, of course, in the hands of the Council of Commissioners by virtue of its being the federation's highest authority. It is natural that the outcome of the dialogue, along with recommendations, will be referred to this council to examine them and to adopt the final decision on them.

[Question] In any case, the Council of Commissioners always approves whatever the Executive Council presents to it. Isn't it so?

[Answer] I disagree with you. You have been attending [sic] the sessions of the Council of Commissioners since it started its real works and you know that several decisions different from or amending the recommendations presented by the Executive Council have been adopted. This indicates that the commissioners have begun to perform a large part of their duties in the required manner. The development is rapid and I believe that the Council of Commissioners will reach the stage when it can try those who deviate from the line it adopts.

[Question] Don't you think that reaching this phase requires amending the federation's regulations?

[Answer] We have presented a plan to amend and develop the federation's bylaws. In accordance with this draft, the Executive Council will become a

body elected by the Council of Commissioners and it will have to present a working program on whose basis it will get its vote of confidence. Moreover, the Council of Commissioners must rely on proportionate representation and this will inevitably lead to a 100 percent change in the balances.

[Question] But the plans to develop the federation's regulations are always shelved because they are in conflict with the interests of a large number of the members. Do you think that the fortunes of this plan will be any better?

[Answer] As you noticed in last July's session of the Council of Commissioners when the plan was on the council's agenda, the council decided to send this plan to the Executive Council to put it in its final form and to return it to the council for ratification. But it has not been returned so far. We will address a message to the Executive Council on this issue very shortly.

[Question] Do you think that the regulations can be amended under the current conditions and that, consequently, elections can be held for the Federation of Workers?

[Answer] I do not consider the current conditions when the discussion pertains to fundamental issues. This is proven by the fact that I conducted the elections of the General Federation of Workers on 10 May 1977 despite the security and political conditions prevailing then--conditions of which we are all aware--and despite the state policy and the absence of a delegate representing the Ministry of Labor.

I don't believe that the current situation is worse than what it was at that time when we were able to fully exercise the democratic right. [End of interview with Ghusn.]

Following is the text of the interview with Abi-Salih:

[Question] Dr Abi-Salih, it can be said that the current enthusiasm for the dialogue between the economic organizations and the General Federation of Workers has aroused the surprise and astonishment of everybody. Considering that you have been the leader of the chairmen of organizations initiating and encouraging this dialogue, what, in your opinion, are the fundamental motives behind this dialogue?

[Answer] The main reason for the dialogue and the fundamental motive that made it a must for the business owners to meet with the labor representatives are the economic and security circumstances under which the country is living. These circumstances pose the threat of a collapse in the economic base which is the source of living for both the workers and the business owners.

The first period of preparation for this conference [sic] was that in which the conflict erupted because of the demands for higher wages and of the inability of the establishments to meet those demands.

The business owners had asserted repeatedly that their negative positions in this regard emanated from their inability and not from their lack of desire. Even though the traditional conflict between the workers and the business owners is a healthy sign in times of prosperity or, at least, ordinary times, such a conflict can produce no results under the difficult and fateful circumstances through which the country is passing.

It is obvious that under ordinary circumstances the cost structure gives the business owners a profit margin ranging from small to moderate and to exorbitant, depending on the conditions and the particulars. But every cost increase can only be translated into an increase in commodity prices or a drop in the percentage of the profit left for the business owner.

Because the circumstance through which the country is going leaves the establishments no profits and even burdens them with debts to cover their losses and with the worsening conditions of these debts month after month and year after year, the only thing left for these establishments is to be permitted to raise their prices in order to be able to meet the increasing burdens, whether resulting from the costs of raw materials, wages, electricity, fuels or other costs.

Naturally, this causes in turn a higher inflation that inevitable leads to the demand for higher wages and so forth, with never a way out of the demonic circle.

This is why the long phase started with the aim of convincing the working class that the current phase requires it to be, even makes it, an indivisible part of the establishment and ties this class's interests with the interests of the business owners inseparably.

These are the reasons and our view of this issue.

[Question] The General Federation of Workers has presented a specific program of demands for 1980. What is your opinion of this program and of its details and what, in your view, are the common points that can be reached?

[Answer] The fact is that the labor program is based on two main points: First, reduced inflation and, second, increased wages. There are other ideas connected with social services that require a longer time to carry out.

What the majority in Lebanon is unaware of is the fact that some of the successful industries cling to neither the demand for increased wages nor to the minimum imposed on them but exceed such wages and minimum by far. The people are also unaware that numerous establishments have been compelled to shut down not only because they were forced to increase their wages but for numerous reasons, all flowing into the channel of higher production costs and lower sales.



This means that the demand for higher wages does not represent a significant rule, except within very narrow limits, insofar as the business owners are concerned and that the law of supply and demand is still and will continue to be the sole criterion for increasing labor wages.

Considering that these establishments, on the basis of what is available to them are not capable of meeting the labor demands, then our efforts to improve the conditions of the working class are in vain.

I find in this the main motive behind the workers' demand, even before the demand of the business owners, that the conditions of the economic establishments be improved. If the demands of the business owners are in accord and concurrent with [the demands for] enabling, encouraging and assisting the economic bases, then the program presented by the federation must be containing positive aspects. The program also draws attention to facts and focuses on priorities that can be considered fundamental.

As for reducing inflation, this requires an increase in production at all levels and in all spheres. It also requires that industry operate at 100 percent of its production capacity so as to reduce its costs. It further requires speeding up the process of repairing whatever has been destroyed of our establishments in all the fields and requires improving the conditions of the infrastructures, neutralizing the economic utilities and resuming employment.

It also requires increase productivity, i.e. mechanization, and improved working conditions and frameworks so that the rate of production per work hour or work day may be raised and, consequently, the ability of the establishments to meet their commitments may be improved.

[Question] But you have not stated specifically what are the common demands or, at least, the demands whose realization you require as a precondition for your approving the labor demands.

[Answer] If the financial, tax and cost demands are realized and the utilities are neutralized, then we are ready to raise the wages and implement all the demands. What continues to be important is raising production. In any case, our demands do not require a long time to carry out and there are draft decrees concerning them. As organizations, we hope that the minimum wage limit will be raised and that the worker's standard [of living] will be improved. However, this is bound to our getting help and to reaching an understanding with the federation to attain a better position for the organizations.

The main problem is the failure to understand the position of the organizations in Lebanon due to the lack of statistics and the lack of courts to regulate the relations and, furthermore, the bankruptcies and other aspects which used to raise the fever of the economic activity usually [sic].

It is the duty of the leaders of the economic sectors to fill this vacuum, to make the situation clear to everybody and to try to revitalize the economic activity.

[Question] Is it likely that an agreement will be impossible to reach? In such a case, what would your position be toward all the issues raised?

[Answer] I don't think it will be impossible to reach an agreement. Such an impossibility is rejected in advance. It is evident from the nature of the demands that we have made that these demands are not factional demands requiring agreement to be reached on them by two factions. They are the demands of the economic situation imposed on both factions and demands that unite these two factions. Therefore, there is no need to reach agreement on demands which, in my view, are the demands of both sides.

But what is worth noting is that if the government fails to move in the direction of improving the conditions of the organizations economically, these organizations will not be able to meet their commitments toward the workers, the state or the consumer. Such failure will not come in the form of civil rebellion or strike but in the form of closing the doors, declaring bankruptcy and ending the work.

[Question] The federation has demanded a certain percentage of wage increase--a percentage recorded by the inflation indicator. Are you ready to pay such an increase in wages, for example?

[Answer] Naturally, insofar as the issue of wage increases or of the other demands by the workers and by the business owners is concerned, there is a program for implementation that must take into consideration the size of these demands and must draw a timetable for their implementation.

[Question] But there is an ultimatum set by the federation for 6 April. Are you going to abide by this date?

[Answer] We know that there is a date set for implementation of the demands. The duty of the subcommittees formed to study the details and the duty of the state is to reconcile the various viewpoints.

[Question] You have mentioned the role of the state frequently. What specifically, in your opinion, is the role of the state in this phase and in the issue of the dialogue in particular?

[Answer] The fundamental and only role belongs to the state. I believe that the state should examine the economic situation thoroughly and should evaluate its actual conditions in the light of Lebanon's social and future interest. The state should proceed immediately to adopt the measures necessary to face this situation. It should resort particularly to the two main means that enable it to control this situation, namely legislation, financing and encouraging investments, insuring economic activity in the areas [provinces] and mechanization.

[Question] According to our information, there is a difference between your views and the view of the heads of the economic organizations, in addition to the differences between the interests of the industrialists and the merchants. Does this difference have an effect on the dialogue and don't you think that the organizations need to hold a dialogue among themselves before the dialogue with the Workers Federation?

[Answer] There is no difference between me and the heads of the other organizations. What is there is the emergence of certain sensitivities emanating from a different interpretation of the free economic system. It is a given fact that we all cling to this system but some of us are afraid of slipping into the labyrinths of [government] guidance to the point where the philosophy of free economy is destroyed. This is why all the projected formulas have been re-examined in a manner that reassures the more radical advocates of the free economy while maintaining the goal sought by the demands. Thus, the discussion and analysis made by representatives of the economic organizations are the sign of good health and have been useful in explaining numerous concepts, keeping in mind that some of the demands are connected with the extraordinary situation through which we are passing and are designed to disappear ultimately when normal conditions are restored.

[Question] What, in your opinion, will be the dimensions of the agreement between the economic organizations and the Federation of Workers in case such an agreement is reached?

[Answer] The dimensions of this agreement will surpass the economic and social conditions and will draw the attention of the majority of the people to healthy social and economic demands that are beneficial to all and that may constitute a starting point bearing all the elements of success because they are demands that have not become the pawns of politics so far.

The detente begins here. Let all people make demands pertaining to their interests, forget political traditions [rancors] and other political aspects and let them all agree with each other.

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